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Notes

PREFACE

1. About twenty years ago, I shifted the focus of my research from ethnographic studies of Chinese villages in Taiwan to ethnographic studies on the popular culture of medicine and biology in the United States. In the ensuing years I wrote about women's experiences of reproduction, as well as popular and scientific understandings of HIV and AIDS. Martin, *Flexible Bodies*; Martin, *The Woman in the Body*.

2. James Baldwin found the gargoyles of Chartres "obscene, inescapable . . . seeming to say that God and the devil can never be divorced" (*Notes of a Native Son*, 174).

3. Although delusions like this are often associated with the diagnosis of schizophrenia, they are also cited in psychiatric definitions of manic depression in standard reference works like the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM). In this book, I will gradually open to scrutiny standard medical terms and definitions such as those that appear in the DSM.

4. Weismantel, *Cholas and Pishtacos*, 8.

5. Baldwin, *Notes of a Native Son*, 174, 61.

6. Ibid., 155, 74–75.

7. A burning issue among these students was that they were forced to take a year's leave upon diagnosis. They would be readmitted if they could show they had been productive during the year away, a condition that some found rather contradictory. Years later the issue would be taken up in the media around concern about litigation over student suicides. See Arenson, "Worried Colleges Step up Efforts over Suicide."

INTRODUCTION

1. McCoy, "Cramer's Real-Time 'Real Money' Shows Land in Local Radio."

2. Schonfeld, "Second Act for Manic CEO."

3. Brink, "CEO Sufferings Trickle Down."

4. Boodman, "Going to Extremes."

5. There are widely accessible books describing the basic psychological elements that make emotions contagious. See Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence*; Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson, *Emotional Contagion*; Kotter, *Leading Change*. There are also articles in magazines for parents that detail how to prevent the worst moods from spreading between parents and children. See, e.g., Fintushel, "Are Bad *Moods* Catching?"

6. Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee, "Primal Leadership," 44.

7. See for example DeWitt and Liu, "The Customer Orientation-Loyalty Model"; Howard and Gengler, "Emotional Contagion Effects on Product Attitudes"; Totterdell, *What Is Emotion Management?*

8. The term "affinity" is from Max Weber's phrase, "elective affinity," used, for example, in his introduction to *Sociology of Religion*. Weber was interested in describing the affinities between different social spheres, such as those between Puritan ethics and capitalist business practices in seventeenth-century England. Weber's emphasis was on the ways affinities reinforced each other and therefore could enhance the development of whole systems such as capitalism. For an imaginative exploration of the concept, see Boon, *Affinities and Extremes*.

9. "Men of the Year."

10. "Americans Should Be Glad."

11. Ibid. David Schneider notes that Americans define humans on the basis of their capacity to reason, as opposed to animals' unreason. Schneider, *American Kinship*, 108.

12. Clifford Geertz relates the disquiet of the Balinese cockfight to its ability to "force together . . . diverse realities" that are "normally well-obscured from view" ("Deep Play," 444).

13. Being diagnosed or treated for bipolar disorder threatens admission to the practice of law in some states. The Florida Board of Bar Examiners, for example, requires special explanation if the candidate to the bar has been charged with a criminal offense, demonstrated violent behavior, been addicted to drugs, or "been treated or received a diagnosis during the last 5 years for schizophrenia or other psychotic disorder; bipolar or major depressive mood disorder; drug or alcohol abuse; impulse control disorder, including kleptomania, pyromania, explosive disorder, pathological or compulsive gambling; or paraphilia such as pedophilia, exhibitionism or voyeurism." Hunter, "Letter Requesting Information."

14. Within the vast philosophical literature on this topic, I have bene-fited in particular from the work of Steven Lukes. See Hollis and Lukes, *Rationality and Relativism*; Lukes, *Liberals and Cannibals*.

15. Berrios, *History of Mental Symptoms*, 291. For Plato and Aristotle, in Berrios's words, "The absence or obliteration of reason led to error and evil with the 'passions' being the main source of perturbation and chaos" (291). "In Greek culture, affective excitement culminating in irrationality was considered as a common mechanism of insanity" (292).

16. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 185.

17. Butterfield, "This Way Madness Lies," 14.

18. This is a characteristic of Florida law. Based on what is known as the M'Naughten rule, a defendant must be shown to have no understanding of the difference between right and wrong in order to use the insanity defense. As of 1998, twenty-two states used a version of the M'Naughten rule, and twenty-six used a version of the American Law Institute model insanity defense statute, which allowed a softening of the M'Naughten rule.

19. Butterfield, "This Way Madness Lies," 14.

20. In the eighteenth century, by John Locke's definition, the mad were *capable* of rational thought, but they started from the wrong assumptions. According to Locke, "[M]admen do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning . . . but having joined some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths; and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles" (*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 1:209–10). Alice Faye Redd's case shows us how far we have diverged from Locke's view. Both the judge and the press agreed that her mental illness (her madness) entailed a *diminished capacity* for rational thought. In her study of the history of colonization in Hawaii, Sally Merry clarifies the role of the law in conferring the status of a rational person: "Law allocates rationality and adulthood when it designates who can vote for whom, who can run for political office, and who can be a citizen. Those given identity within the law as citizens and deemed capable of contractual relationships were de-fined as rational and civilized; others were labeled irrational, animalistic and dangerous" ("Law and Identity in an American Colony," 149).

21. Kraepelin, *Manic-Depressive Insanity and Paranoia*.

22. Martha Nussbaum's discussion of the role of emotions in the law, connected to Western traditions derived from Aristotle, illuminates how the law is better equipped to handle more ordinary emotional states (*Hiding from Humanity*, 23ff.).

23. Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*.

24. Luhrmann, *Of Two Minds*, 270.

25. Styron, *Darkness Visible*.

26. These dichotomies have been described as characteristic of people of the modern era, who, bolstered by the power of Western science and capitalist expansion, operated by a "constitution" that abjured hybrids that fell in between. To moderns, "hybrids present the horror that must be avoided at all costs by a ceaseless, even maniacal purification." Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, 112.

27. Estimates of the prevalence of bipolar disorder are complicated because studies use different units of measurement and different criteria for what counts as bipolar disorder. The common estimate that in the United States 1 percent of the population has bipolar disorder is being challenged by new studies that argue for a higher figure, at least 5 percent. See Akiskal et al., "Re-Evaluating the Prevalence of and Diagnostic Composition within the Broad Clinical Spectrum of Bipolar Disorders." Table 3 (see appendix) shows some published (international) comparative statistics using a twelve-month prevalence—the proportion of individuals who manifest the condition over one year. Table 4 (see appendix) shows statistics for twelve-month prevalence in the United States.

28. Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*, 137–38.

29. In her perceptive ethnography of atherosclerosis, Annemarie Mol prefers to speak of enactment rather than performance to capture the ways diagnoses and treatment come into being. For her case, performance would raise too many possibilities: the existence of a stage and a backstage, the question of success or failure, and the issue of effects beyond the performance. For my case, where the attribution of rationality is at stake, these are exactly the possibilities I want to raise. Mol, *The Body Multiple*, 32–33.

30. Joyce, *The Rule of Freedom*, 41.

31. A perceptive account of the "style of thought" of biological psychiatry in historical context is in Rose, "The Neurochemical Self and Its Anomalies."

32. On a popular rendition of the neural location of emotions, see Blakeslee, "Humanity? Maybe It's in the Wiring." For MRIs illustrating a "murderer's brain" and the brain of a depressed person, see Carter, *Mapping the Mind*, 92, 99. Joseph Dumit has done an important ethnographic study of how MRIs are understood and function culturally. See his *Picturing Personhood*.

33. Tierney, "Using MRI Machines," A17.

34. Jamison, *An Unquiet Mind*, 191.

35. Hinshaw, *The Years of Silence Are Past*, 132.

36. Although during my fieldwork there was a major breakthrough in neuroscience, demonstrating for the first time that learning enables the adult mammalian brain to grow new neurons, this experimental finding had not yet had an impact on people's general sense of their mind's capacity. See Gould et al., "Neurogenesis in Adulthood." For a review of the impact of this work, see Gould and Gross, "Neurogenesis in Adult Mammals."

37. Some of the best-known books written by doctors to educate the public about mood disorders do not reduce the cause of mood disorders to the physical realm. They manage this by discussing a wide range of contributing factors, from social environment to family history. See Torrey and Knable, *Surviving Manic Depression*; Mondimore, *Bipolar Disorder*.

38. For a discussion of how methodological variation between studies makes it difficult to determine the prevalence of mood disorders comparatively, see Waraich et al., "Prevalence and Incidence Studies of Mood Disorders."

39. A kind interlocutor from the industry allowed me this glimpse. I describe the circumstances in chapter 9.

40. Carey, "Use of Antipsychotics by the Young Rose Fivefold."

41. Light and Lexchin, "The International War on Cheap Drugs."

42. Landers, "Waiting for Prozac."

43. See McClay, *The Masterless*; Cushman, *Constructing the Self*.

44. Gamwell and Tomes, "The Asylum in Antebellum America."

45. Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, 9.

46. See MacDonald, *Mystical Bedlam*, 9–10. This book provides a detailed discussion about the disjunction in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries between supernatural accounts of madness preferred by religious believers and secular accounts preferred by physicians who relied on their increasing understanding of physical science.

47. Screech, "Good Madness in Christendom."

48. Rather, "The Six-Things Non-Natural."

49. Berrios, *History of Mental Symptoms*.

50. Roy Porter gives a lucid overview of this chapter in the history of madness (*Madness*, 56–61).

51. See chapter 9 of Watson, *Basic Writings in the History of Psychology*. which discusses one of the founders of faculty psychology, Christian von

Wolff, and his division of the faculties of the mind into "knowing" on the one hand and "feeling and desire" on the other. S. Alexander Rippa traces the influence of faculty psychology on specifically American educational theories (*Education in a Free Society*, 217–19).

52. The clinical usefulness of the intellectual view of madness had already been challenged early in the century by Pinel, Prichard, and Heinroth, as described in Berrios, *History of Mental Symptoms*, 294. Generally in the nineteenth century, physical explanations of mental illness were dominant, in England at any rate. Andrew Scull's trenchant account makes this plain (*Social Order/Mental Disorder*, 24–27). But the details were far from clear. Allan Young explains the debates in the mid-nineteenth century over whether faculties were properly found in the brain, the mind, or were best abandoned (*The Harmony of Illusions*).

53. Berrios, *History of Mental Symptoms*, 295.

54. Darwin wrote that "the main difficulty in elucidating emotions consists in the fact that the major part is due to historical antecedents registered in the susceptible organisms, but little to individual acquisitions. No experience of the individual can account for the strength or the direction of feeling" (quoted in Berrios, *History of Mental Symptoms*, 296). In this Darwin echoed Herbert Spencer, who held that "the doctrine maintained by some philosophers, that all the desires, all the sentiments, are generated by the experiences of the individual, is so glaringly at variance with hosts of facts, that I cannot but wonder how any one [*sic*] should ever have entertained it." Quoted in R. Young, *Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century*, 182–83. See also Browne, "Darwin and the Face of Madness."

55. Berrios, *History of Mental Symptoms*, 298.

56. Ibid., 298–99.

57. Berrios, *History of Mental Symptoms*, 298.

58. Berrios has questioned how central Kraepelin's concern with the affective realm was. Kraepelin's distinction between dementia praecox and manic depression "appears to be based on a distinction between thinking and affect, respectively." But alongside his criteria for the prognosis of manic depression, heredity involved only the "presence of excitement or inhibition." "As far as this writer has been able to determine, nowhere did Kraepelin say that manic-depressive insanity was a *primary disorder* of affect" (Berrios, *History of Mental Symptoms*, 297).

59. Berrios, *History of Mental Symptoms*, 297. Contemporaneous with abstract schemes for classifying mental disorders were rich qualitative descriptions of the specifically emotional side of the emerging categories of

mental illness. In Karl Jaspers's account, the manic fairly flies off the page: "The massive associations at his disposal come spontaneously and uncalled for. They make him witty and sparkling; they also make it impossible for him to maintain any determining tendency and render him at the same time superficial and confused. Physically and mentally he feels that he is extremely healthy and strong. He thinks his abilities are outstanding. With unfailing optimism the patient will contemplate all things around him, the whole world and his own future in the rosiest of lights. Everything is as bright and happy as can be. His ideas and thoughts all agree on this point most harmoniously; to any other idea he is wholly inaccessible" (*General Psychopathology*, 2:596). Kraepelin wrote that the depressed patient "cannot collect his thoughts or pull himself together; his thoughts are as if paralysed, they are immobile. His head feels heavy, quite stupid, as if a board were pushed in front of it, everything is confused. He is no longer able to perceive, or to follow the train of thought of a book or a conversation, he feels weary, enervated, inattentive, inwardly empty; he has no memory, he has no longer command of knowledge formerly familiar to him, he must consider a long time about simple things, he calculates wrongly, makes contradictory statements, does not find words, cannot construct sentences correctly" (*Manic-Depressive Insanity and Paranoia*, 75).

60. Goodwin and Jamison, *Manic-Depressive Illness*, 61.

61. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," 161. When Freud's ideas took hold in the United States, they were in the guise of the ego psychology developed by his daughter, Anna Freud. With few exceptions, American psychoanalysts were identified with ego psychology from the 1940s to the 1960s. Thereafter, this psychoanalytic approach lost ground to new forms of therapy focused on group dynamics and individual identity, on the one hand, and to new research in the neurological sciences, on the other. Zaretsky, *Secrets of the Soul*, 333–35.

62. Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, 54–55. Current scholarship has taken Freud's ideas in a number of productive directions. Juliana Schiesari gives a detailed reading of how melancholia is gendered in Renaissance literature (*The Gendering of Melancholia*). *Loss: The Politics of Mourning*, by Eng and Kazanjian, provides a set of case studies of the role of melancholia and mourning in history and politics.

63. Klein, "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States." See also the work D. W. Winnicott did to develop Klein's theories on the depressive position and the manic defense ("The Manic Defense"). Mabel Blake Cohen et al. provide a useful overview of Freud's, Klein's,

and other psychoanalysts' work on mania and depression ("An Intensive Study of Twelve Cases of Manic-Depressive Psychosis").

64. I read all accounts of mania contained in the *New York Times* using ProQuest's Historical Newspapers index, which covers the years 1851–2001.

65. "Mania Kills Man by Push on Elevated."

66. Staff Correspondent, "Mrs. Fosdick Kills 2 Children and Self."

67. "Chemistry of Insanity."

68. Lawrence, "New Vistas Opened for Chemical Approach to the Treatment of Mental Illness"; Lawrence, "Chemical's Cure of Insane Is Seen."

69. "TV Review: 'Manhattan' Series in Debut on Channel 2."

70. "Main Types of Mental Disorder Explained for the Red Cross."

71. R. Prescott, "Food Consumption, Prices, and Expenditures, 1960–81."

72. Jayson, *Mania*, 214.

73. Jewell, "Ruskin's Life Explains His Works."

74. Ibid.

75. O. Prescott, "Books of the Times."

76. "Leonard Woolf Is Dead at 88."

77. Finkelstein, "Lithium Therapy."

78. L. Brown, "Lithium Use in 'Maude,' Medical Issue."

79. The film is in the History of Medicine collection in the National Library of Medicine. In expressing these views, Fieve tapped into an older clinical tradition in which, writing in technical publications, doctors had for some time been associating manic depression with worldly success. In 1926 Ernst Kretschmer wrote, "In our material there are many excellent examples, where hypomanics, who must certainly be reckoned to the buoyant group, have had astonishing and lasting success in certain walks of life, e.g., merchants, speakers, journalists, etc., and are regarded with great respect by their colleagues. Their positive peculiarities are their tireless energy for, and enjoyment in, their work, their temperament, sharpness, élan, daring, lovableness, adaptability, free unshackled natures, skill in the handling of men, richness of ideas, eloquence, and an astonishingly clear eye for the right moment" (*Physique and Character*, 131).

80. Bentley, "Man's Despair, and Hope."

81. Jamison et al., "Clouds and Silver Linings."

82. Jamison, *Touched with Fire*, 267–70.

83. "Display Ad 52—No Title."

84. Jamison, "Manic-Depressive Illness and Creativity," 63.

85. Goodwin and Jamison, *Manic-Depressive Illness*.

86. Similar concerts were also organized by Jamison in St. Louis and Washington, DC.

87. There are too many to cite here, but *Bipolar Disorder for Dummies*, published in 2005 by Fink and Kraynak, indicates how far the term had come into everyday use.

88. http://www.dbsalliance.org/NameChange.html. See table 5 in the appendix.

89. Wolfe, *A Man in Full*, 195. Wolfe may be alluding to Ted Turner's important role in Atlanta business and his association with bipolar disorder.

90. Jamison, *An Unquiet Mind*, 182.

91. Ibid., 181.

92. Ibid., 182.

93. Harry Stack Sullivan's work contributed to this effort. Without minimizing its specific features, Sullivan argued that "schizophrenic phenomenology" required "for its complete exposition nothing different in essential quality from the elements of commonplace human life" (*Schizophrenia as a Human Process*, 200). More boldly, he also asserted, "I am convinced that in the schizophrenic processes and in the preliminaries of schizophrenic illness—so common among adolescents who are having trouble in their social adjustments—can be seen, in almost laboratory simplicity, glimpses which will combine as a mosaic that explains many more than half of the adult personalities that one encounters" (201–2). Thanks to Amy Smiley for steering me to this point.

94. "The New Jobs: What They Are, What They Pay." As one example of these changes, the Sparrows Point plant of Bethlehem Steel had been an important source of economic security for Baltimore's working class since the early 1900s. After World War II, the plant reached its peak employment of 35,000 workers: union wages supported second- or third-generation steelworkers in middle-class lifestyles. Because of steel imports, the plant workforce was reduced to 8,000 by the mid-1980s (Putting Baltimore's People First, *Putting Baltimore's People First*). In October 2001, Bethlehem Steel filed for bankruptcy, by then supporting a workforce of only 4,000 ("U.S. Steel Losing the Game"). In January 2003, with a workforce of 3,200, management approved the sale of the company to International Steel Group and was expected to lay off 1,000 of the remaining

workers ("End Arrives for Bethlehem Steel"). Statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor show the dramatic fall in manufacturing jobs and rise in service jobs for the Baltimore metropolitan region, a decline that continued into the period 1995–2005 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, "State and Area Employment, Hours, and Earnings").

95. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity.*

96. For example, during my fieldwork, the University of California at Irvine's College of Medicine held an evening symposium for the general public called "Human Brain Research for the Layman." An audience of several hundred crammed in, filling all seats as well as the stairways and standing room at the rear of the auditorium to listen to highly technical illustrated talks from twelve brain scientists and psychiatrists at UCI. The speakers focused on brain-imaging techniques and later mingled with the crowd over punch and cookies.

97. The term "post-suburban" has been defined as "vast urbanized areas for which the concept of urban dominance is becoming obsolete. These areas constitute a settlement-space form that is poly-nucleated, functionally dispersed, culturally fragmented, yet hierarchically organized, and that extends for tens and even hundreds of miles . . . They are neither suburbs nor satellite cities; rather, they are fully urbanized and independent spaces that are not dominated by any central city." Gottdiener and Kephart, "The Multinucleated Metropolitan Region," 34.

98. See Attention! in the sample issue of *Culture Matters*, a general interest magazine for cultural anthropology, http://www.nyu.edu/fas/ihpk/CultureMatters/index2.htm (accessed October 4, 2006).

99. McGarry and Joye, U.S. Census, New Jersey; Southern New Jersey Regional Developments, "Southern New Jersey Regional Developments." More significant than the number of pharmaceuticals in New Jersey is that the headquarters of three of the top four drug companies in worldwide sales are located in the state. Morrow, "Smithkline and American Home Are Talking of Huge Drug Merger."

Chapter 1

1. For anthropologists, the classic source on the concept of personhood is Mauss, "A Category of the Human Mind."

2. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, 3. Attwood Gaines specifies that the prevailing conception of personhood in

the United States has its roots in northern European, German Protestant culture. This concept stresses the person's autonomy from other persons and control over the self ("From DSM-I to III-R," 11).

3. Marilyn Strathern, building on a comparison with Melanesian concepts of personhood, describes the contemporary person in Euro-American culture as an agent in whom intention, located within, is the cause of his action. The person is "a carrier, so to speak, not of persons but of the self, and intention and cause are thereby 'expressed' in the fulfillment of his or her wishes" ("Disembodied Choice," 73). Alain Ehrenberg puts the contemporary French version of this tradition in a nutshell: "L'action aujourd'hui s'est individualisée. Elle n'a alors d'autre source que l'agent qui l'accomplit et dont il est le seul responsable. L'initiative des individus passé au premier plan des critères qui mesurent la valeur de la personne" (Nowadays, action has acquired a wholly individual significance. The origin of an action is its agent; he alone is responsible. Of all the criteria one might use to judge a person's merit, initiative is foremost.) Translation by Amy Smiley. Ehrenberg, *La fatigue d'être soi*, 198.

4. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," 163–64. Elias Canetti described mania as a "paroxysm of desire" by analogy to the hunter's quest for prey (*Crowds and Power*, 347).

5. James, "Census of Hallucinations."

6. Napier, *Foreign Bodies*, 163.

7. Whyte, *The Organization Man*.

8. Walkerdine, "Beyond Developmentalism?" 455.

9. Turkle, *Life on the Screen*, 179. The ideal person of the time embodied in many ways what both Marx and Weber described as "rationality." For Weber, economic rationality involved application of the best technical means and quantitative calculation to efficiently reach one's ends; for Marx, it was necessary to detail the ideal principles of rational markets capitalism espoused—free and equal exchange among autonomous agents—to see the ways in which in practice they were anything but rational. See Baran and Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital*, 338.

10. Whyte, *The Organization Man*, 408.

11. Lunbeck, *The Psychiatric Persuasion*, 68–69.

12. Stearns, *American Cool*, 53. Susan Buck-Morss shows the importance of the cognitive deadening of the factory system, written about so vividly by Walter Benjamin, for the new "human sensorium" of modernity, which is both overstimulated and, as a result, numbed ("The City as Dreamworld and Catastrophe," 8).

13. K. Newman, *Falling from Grace*. See also Harrison and Bluestone, *The Great U-Turn*.

14. See table 6 in the appendix.

15. See Nohria and Berkley, "The Virtual Organization," for one description of how perceptions of time and space are changed by electronic communication.

16. Turkle, *Life on the Screen*.

17. The classic analysis of this process is Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*. For an insightful social history of the asylum, see Rothman, *The Discovery of the Asylum*.

18. McClellan, "No Degree, and No Way Back to the Middle."

19. For a compelling review of Marx's description of how, under capitalism, people's personalities must take on a fluid and open form as they learn to strive for constant change, see Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air*. Since Marx's time, the extent and scale of the development ideal have increased. In the realm of health, for example, people are contending with a series of new ideas about healthy bodies: bodies, which, like the new corporations, are exhorted to become lean, agile, and quick, so that they can adjust to new and frightening pathogens. Health now seems to result not from such measures as state-mandated vaccinations offered on a mass scale by central governments, but from the preventive maintenance each individual carries out in accord with a specific, tailor-made program of health, diet, exercise, and stress-reduction techniques.

20. This way of thinking has also gained a religious tone. Bill McKibben points out that although the majority of Americans believe that the adage "God helps those who help themselves" appears in the Bible, "this uber-American idea, a notion at the core of our current individualist politics and culture . . . was in fact uttered by Ben Franklin" ("The Christian Paradox," 31).

21. For the history and development of neoliberal ideas and policies, see Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*; Strathern, "Enterprising Kinship"; Rouse, "Thinking through Transnationalism."

22. Norris, "Greenspan Era Taught People to Gamble."

23. Nineteen percent of Americans, according to a 1996 poll, are self-employed, freelance, or sequential temporary workers (Saltzman, "How to Prosper in the You, Inc. Age," 71). Numbers of these categories of workers are difficult to come by because they are not counted separately in standard Department of Labor statistics. For recent estimates of the numbers of freelance workers, see Teicher, "Freelancing in Your Future?"

24. Saltzman, "How to Prosper in the You, Inc. Age," 71.

25. Pulley, *Losing Your Job—Reclaiming Your Soul*, 136.

26. For recent anthropological analyses of global processes in relation to culture, see Gupta and Ferguson, "Beyond 'Culture.'" See also Maurer, "Complex Subjects."

27. Postrel, *The Future and Its Enemies*, xv.

28. Ibid., 57.

29. Hembrooke and Gay, "The Laptop and the Lecture."

30. In France, what the social theorist Jacques Donzelot calls "changing people's attitudes to change" has made its appearance through the *legal* right of every worker to "continued retraining [*formation permanente*]": people are thought to *require* an active attitude toward change. Continued retraining "must therefore literally be a continuous process of retraining, from the cradle to the grave, designed to provide the individual with a feeling of autonomy in relation to work, and at work" (Donzelot, "Pleasure in Work," 273).

31. Historically, emotional flexibility has been associated with an increase in the importance of advanced capitalist institutions. In an important study, William Reddy has shown how, in the French case, increasing contractual relations after the Revolution brought about more, not less, emotional flexibility (*The Navigation of Feeling*, 312–14).

32. American Psychiatric Association Task Force on DSM-IV, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV-TR*, 825.

33. Ibid., 362.

34. This list is slightly simplified and shortened. For the full list of criteria, see American Psychiatric Association Task Force on DSM-IV, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV-TR*, 356.

35. When I use the pronoun "we" in a general sense, I refer to people who participate in the Western, Euro-American historical tradition and share at least some of its basic assumptions; when I use the term "American," I refer only to residents of the United States.

36. Lutz and Abu-Lughod, *Language and the Politics of Emotion*.

37. Crapanzano, *Hermes' Dilemma and Hamlet's Desire*, 232. C. Lutz shows that among the Ifaluk in the Western Caroline Islands, emotion words are not seen as referents of internal feeling states, but as statements about the relationship between a person and an event involving other people ("The Domain of Emotion Words on Ifaluk").

38. R. Porter, *Madness*, 42.

39. Goodwin and Jamison, *Manic-Depressive Illness*, 58.

40. Quoted in ibid., 59.

41. Kraepelin, *Manic-Depressive Insanity and Paranoia*.

42. Ibid., 24. Mania and depression were "combined into the new concept of alternating, periodic, circular or double-form insanity. This process culminated with Kraepelin's concept of 'manic-depressive insanity' which included most forms of affective disorder under the same umbrella" (Berrios, *History of Mental Symptoms*, 298–99).

43. Kraepelin, *Manic-Depressive Insanity and Paranoia*, 5–74.

44. Ibid., 2.

45. Ibid., 24.

46. Ibid., 2. Emphasis in original.

47. Contemporary discussions of categories in successive versions of the DSM focus on the differences and similarities between unipolar affective illness (involving only depression) and bipolar affective disorders. They also focus on how to classify the widely varying degrees of mania and depression in individuals (involving alternation between varying degrees of depression and mania). Goodwin and Jamison, *Manic-Depressive Illness*, 70.

48. For the complexities of defining emotion in psychology, see Ekman and Davidson, *The Nature of Emotion*. A useful review of the issues from a neurologist is LeDoux, "Emotion: Clues from the Brain." For ethnographic accounts that founded the contemporary inquiry into the social meaning of emotions, see Lutz and Abu-Lughod, *Language and the Politics of Emotion*; Lutz and White, "The Anthropology of Emotions"; M. Rosaldo, *Knowledge and Passion*; R. Rosaldo, "Grief and a Headhunter's Rage"; R. Solomon, "Getting Angry." There is support for the endeavor in other fields as well. The philosopher Errol Bedford argued in a classic paper that emotion concepts are not only psychological but have to be understood in the context of a wide range of social relationships, institutions, and concepts ("Emotions"). See also Harré, *Physical Being*; and S. Williams, *Emotion and Social Theory*.

49. Crapanzano, *Hermes' Dilemma and Hamlet's Desire*, 232.

50. Ibid., 235.

51. Drawing on his expertise in developmental psychology, William Reddy argues that emotional expressions (he calls them emotives), like performatives, change the world because they change the speaker and his or her feelings (*The Navigation of Feeling*, 96–111).

52. Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," 97.

53. The philosopher Gilbert Ryle gives us some markers to follow in the maze of terms used in ordinary English to designate mental states like moods: "Moods . . . monopolize. To say that [a person] is in one mood is . . . to say that he is not in any other. To be in a conversational mood is not to be in a reading, writing or lawn-mowing mood" (*The Concept of Mind*, 99). But to say that moods monopolize is not to say they are all equally intense. As I mentioned, Clifford Geertz stresses the variation in intensity among mood states, some of which can "go nowhere."

54. Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," 96.

55. Ibid., 97.

56. Elizabeth Lunbeck, personal communication, October 2003. Karl Jaspers, writing in 1913, spoke of depressive states as involving a "loss in productivity which may be transient or lasting"; hypomanic states as involving "exceptional productivity, of the richest creativeness" (*General Psychopathology*, 1:217). For historical analysis of the concept of the will in the nineteenth century, see Berrios, "The Psychopathology of Affectivity."

57. E. Sullivan, "Mood in Relation to Performance."

58. Sass, "Affectivity in Schizophrenia."

59. Ibid.

60. Anthropologist Janis Hunter Jenkins's work on schizophrenia speaks directly and perceptively to this issue. She stresses the complexity of emotion in the experience of a person with schizophrenia and the possible role of a disjunction between such a person's facial expression and his or her subjective experience. See Jenkins, "Schizophrenia as a Paradigm Case for Understanding Fundamental Human Processes," 42–44.

61. Quoted in Sass, *Madness and Modernism*, 50.

62. Ibid., 26.

63. Writing in 1926, Sophus Thalbitzer described this watershed, which his own work on manic depression had helped bring about, as follows: "The fact that the disorders of mood have hitherto not been much used to throw light on normal emotional life is due to a great extent to the relatively new classification of the mood-psychoses as an independent, clearly defined group of diseases. This does not mean that the great changes in emotional life which appear in almost all forms of mental disease, had hitherto been overlooked; but the dividing line had not been clearly and consciously drawn between the mental diseases in which the abnormal mood for the main part is secondary in relation to the primary changes in the intellectual

sphere (hallucinations and illusions), and the mental disorders in which the distortion of mood in one direction or the other is the essential factor" (*Emotion and Insanity*, 41).

64. T. Lutz, *American Nervousness, 1903*, 4. In another evocative description, neurasthenia "embodied a new anxious sensibility of the excitable subject as symptom, mirror, and source of worldly forces; suddenly, both the self and the surrounding world seemed at once diffuse, weightless, floating, and unreal, weighted down with symptoms, haunted, immobilized, and excessively sensory and concrete" (Harding and Stewart, "Anxieties of Influence," 258). The neurasthenic's "paralysis of will, his sense that he was no longer able to plunge into 'the vital currents of life,' his feeling that life had become somehow unreal" amounted to a feeling of "inner emptiness" that was nonetheless harnessed to an imperative to produce. At its beginning, neurasthenia was a disease of the male subject, the one who was thought to suffer most from the pressures of urban society, the demands of competition in the business world, and the pressure to succeed. Showalter, *The Female Malady*, 174.

65. Lears, "From Salvation to Self-Realization," 7–9.

66. G. Lakoff, *Moral Politics*, 65.

67. Goldstein, "Butching up for Victory," 13.

68. An important area that needs research is the reaction to extreme states like mania in other parts of the world system. There is certainly no one thing that could be called mania in other cultures. But recent ethnographic studies of the disposition of authorities toward extreme experiences akin to mania make some tentative comparisons possible. On the periphery of the global system, under postcolonial conditions, manic-like states are anything but valued by the dominant sectors. For example, Nancy Chen describes how in China, *falungong*, a spiritual and physical practice that taps into vital energy, has been recently denounced by the state and by leading scientists as a cult that promoted superstition and disorder, the antithesis of rational knowledge (*Breathing Spaces*, 177). Faced with tensions between its desire for centralized order and the forces of market liberalism, falungong's unregulated and unbridled energy was seen as a threat. State regulation tried to force it into either a sanctioned arena—state-sponsored sport-like events—or a deviant area—mental illness (186). For another, in Good and Subandi's account of a Javanese woman's psychosis, we glean some hints about how extreme states are regarded in Indonesia. As we know from Benedict Anderson's work, the "idea of power" in Java is

a mysterious, divine energy that permeates the universe. The "entire cosmos [is] suffused by a formless, constantly creative energy" (*Imagined Communities*, 7). But the potency of the self is constituted by spiritual practices that enhance restraint and refinement in language, sentiment, and behavior, correlated with social status (Keeler, "Shame and Stage Fright in Java"). The break with decorum that can come with psychosis is experienced as profoundly embarrassing because it threatens the place of the self in the status hierarchy. The psychotic person may also be seen as in touch with the omnipresent divine energy of the universe but insufficiently potent to handle it without being harmed. See Good and Subandi, "Experiences of Psychosis in Javanese Culture."

69. Comaroff and Comaroff, "Millennial Capitalism," 10.

Chapter 2

1. Sass, *The Paradoxes of Delusion*, 21.

2. Kraepelin, *Manic-Depressive Insanity and Paranoia*, 61, emphasis added. A manic-depressive's mistaken identities can "appear to be more an amusing game in which the patient takes pleasure, partially conscious of the arbitrariness of the designation. That occurs especially at the decline of excitement, when the wrong designations are still adhered to, while from the other conduct and occasional utterances of the patient it is evident that he is quite clear about his place of residence and the people round him" (Kraepelin, *Manic-Depressive Insanity and Paranoia*, 7).

3. Rather than tape recording, I often took notes on the spot and then wrote a full account as soon as possible, although all of the interviews I did with pharmaceutical personnel and most of the interviews I did with heads of organizations were tape recorded. In quoted interviews, an ellipsis indicates a pause; in quoted written materials, an ellipsis indicates an omission. I have not constructed composite quotations out of statements made by more than one person. All personal names are pseudonyms, except for those of my academic colleagues and authors speaking about their published work.

4. William Burroughs describes the dress style of the Wild Boys in this way: "[T]here are Bowery suits that appear to be stained with urine and vomit which on closer inspection turn out to be intricate embroideries of fine gold thread . . . it is the double take and many carry it much further to as many as six takes." Quoted in Hebdige, *Subculture*, 24.

5. Bauman, "Verbal Art as Performance," 305.

6. Judith Butler's work has been central in formulating the position that gender is not a role enacted by or expressing a preexisting interior self. Rather gender is an effect of performative acts: "Gender must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self" ("Performative Acts and Gender Constitution," 519). Butler's theory of gender identity also has a performative aspect. In her theory, feminine and masculine dispositions are formed as the effect of the prohibition against same-sexed desire. The child's love for his or her same-sexed parent is forbidden on two grounds: first, homosexual desire is forbidden, and second, parent-child desire is forbidden through the incest taboo. Therefore, the child inevitably experiences the loss of his or her same-sexed parent as an object of desire. Following Freud's analysis of melancholia, Butler argues that an object of desire that is lost but cannot be mourned leads to identification with that object. The result is that the child identifies with the lost same-sex parent and incorporates that parent's gender identity—and becomes—a male or female person (*Gender Trouble*, 63–64). Thus the child's gender identity arises performatively (as an effect of) a set of intimate relationships. There is a very rich literature in anthropology on performance (as opposed to performativity) as it plays a part in rituals. A useful collection of essays that focuses on the ways performance can be efficacious in rituals of healing is Laderman and Roseman, *The Performance of Healing*.

7. Sally and Leslie Swartz analyze an interview with a woman in a psychiatric hospital for a manic breakdown. They find that the woman uses "metacommentary"—she refers to the ongoing talk in the interview—and they argue that this makes her apparently unintelligible discourse coherent (Swartz and Swartz, "Talk about Talk").

8. Peggy Phelan, personal communication, March 15, 1999.

9. Fidler, *Affective Disorders*.

10. I do not know how widely these simulations are used, but they are listed in a variety of catalogues of teaching materials on the Web. Charles Nuckolls describes how dramatic enactments were used for teaching in one medical school with such success that plans were made to produce and market them to other medical schools (*Culture*, 209–10). Less formal versions of these scenes were enacted many times in the course of my observations of psychiatric training. In impromptu skits, more advanced students or residents would be designated the roles of patient and doctor

to illustrate to less advanced students the salient behaviors and how they might be treated. One of these teaching sessions was recorded by the film crew of the television series *Hopkins 24/7*, aired by ABC. The segment did not make it into the ABC series, but was included by an HBO production made from the unused footage in a series called *Nurses*.

11. Mischer, "An Evening with Robin Williams."

12. Holtzman, Shenton, and Solovay, "Quality of Thought Disorder in Differential Diagnosis," 379. This study differentiated thought disorders in manic-depressive and schizophrenic patients by analyzing their tape-recorded verbal responses to the Rorschach Test.

13. Kraepelin, *Manic-Depressive Insanity and Paranoia*, 27.

14. Cushman, *Constructing the Self*, 92, 97. In a trenchant critique, Atwood Gaines argues that the prevalent U.S. "cultural ideal of a con-trolled, rational self" is embodied in the DSM's assumptions about what a mental disorder is ("From DSM-I to III-R," 13).

15. Le Bon, *The Crowd*, 12. Plotz provides many literary examples of how crowds were feared in England (*The Crowd*).

16. Such associations between crowds and irrational behavior persist today, as in an assessment of the exemplary rational behavior of passengers and crew after an airplane crash in Toronto: "One survivor of the Air France crash in Toronto on Tuesday described the 'panic' of his fellow passengers. Yet these people had just evacuated a burning plane in about two minutes. While they had had critical help from the plane's crew members, those trained professionals were busy assisting people with limited mobility, not providing psychotherapy. Thus what the passenger observed was clearly not 'panic' in the sense of an unthinking crowd acting irrationally and abandoning the norms of civilized behavior. Indeed, it was the exact oppo-site. The Air France evacuation required an extraordinary degree of social coordination—which emerged among a group of strangers with virtually no time to prepare" (Fischhoff, "A Hero in Every Aisle Seat").

17. Dr. Sagar Parikh of the Bipolar Clinic at Clarke Institute in Toronto used the phrase "riding the tiger" to describe this. Tillson, "The CEO's Disease," 31.

18. Gay, "PBS' New Film about Theodore Roosevelt Chronicles the Many Sides of a Passionate, Energetic Man."

19. Gaines, "From DSM-I to III-R," 11.

20. Joel Robbins explores the pervasive attachment of anthropologists to "continuity thinking," which leads us to emphasize continuity over dis-continuity in the cultural forms we study. He suspects that we privilege

continuity because it is so deeply rooted in our commonsense notions. See his "On the Paradoxes of Global Pentecostalism and the Perils of Continuity Thinking."

21. Jamison, *An Unquiet Mind*, 68.

22. An astute discussion of the role of having an interpretation in coming to conclusions about rationality is in Risjord, *Woodcutters and Witchcraft*, 13–33.

23. I am indebted to Susan Harding for seeing this dimension of my material in relation to her ethnographic work on fundamentalist Christians. See Harding, *The Book of Jerry Falwell*.

24. When I learned from my primatology colleagues at NYU that they call a similar "heads up" signal among nonhuman primates an "eye flash," I adopted the term.

25. Some examples: what are three things wrong with the penis? It has ring around the collar, hangs out with nuts, and lives next to an asshole. Why is the blonde's belly button black and blue after sex? Because her boyfriend's a blonde, too.

26. In *Madness and Modernism*, Louis Sass describes the particular form "meta" communication takes in schizophrenia. Use of irony (a form of inner distance from the self) and even a subtly mocking ironic tone convey the schizophrenic's degree of "meta-awareness," which, Sass argues, is not "congruent with standard conceptions of cognitive breakdown" (113). But Sass also asserts that meta-awareness alone is not sufficient to impart normality to the schizophrenic condition. The burden remains: a "disconcerting awkwardness and rigidity, a lack of free-flowing activity and syntonic social ease" (115). I am positing that the form of meta-awareness that I observed in bipolar support groups is somewhat different than in schizophrenia because it comes about through interpersonal interactions in a social setting. However, in common with Sass's argument, I would agree that meta-awareness alone does not relieve the bipolar condition of its burdens.

27. I am drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of double-voicing: "In . . . the double-voiced word, the sounding of a second voice is a part of the project of the utterance. In one way or another, for one reason or another, the author makes use 'of someone else's discourse for his own purposes by inserting a new semantic intention into a discourse which already has and which retains, an intention of its own'" (Morson and Emerson, *Mikhail Bakhtin*), 149.

28. This is like what Canetti called the "discharge," "the moment when all who belong to the crowd get rid of their differences and feel equal" (*Crowds and Power*, 17).

29. Bauman, *Verbal Art as Performance*, 11.

30. Ramanujan quoted in Brenneis, "Dramatic Gestures," 230.

31. Ibid., 230, 231.

32. Raymond Williams uses these terms to describe structures of feeling, which are "social experiences *in solution*, as distinct from other social semantic formations which have been *precipitated* and are more evidently and more immediately available" (*Marxism and Literature*, 134; emphasis in original).

33. Ginzburg, "Style as Inclusion, Style as Exclusion," 27.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 34–35, 36.

36. "As the poet wrote with his style or pen, and the designer sketched with his style or pencil, the name of the instrument was familiarly used to express the genius and productions of the writer and the artist." Hence the term "style" connoted a connection between "mind and hands." Subsequently, Hegel and Heinrich Heine both used "style" in connection with a familiar Romantic theme—artistic freedom (Ginzburg, "Style as Inclusion, Style as Exclusion," 35–36).

37. Ibid., 45.

38. Winter, "The Affective Properties of Styles," 67.

39. Ibid., 71–72. In the case of Hebdige, his analysis of style by subcultures like punk points to its use to escape the bourgeois norm (*Subculture*). This subculture is interested in: how to refuse (3), detach from the taken for granted (19), disrupt (138), parody (139), and challenge hegemony obliquely in style (17). This subject position is dramatically different from that of my support group companions, who are already, and not necessarily by choice, relegated to the "abnormal." Their problem is how to gain the dignity of membership in humankind without being stultified by the "normal."

Stuart Ewen outlines the historical changes by which U.S. consumer society has made style "a cardinal feature of economic life," providing a "vast palette of symbolic meanings" that could be used to assemble a public self. See Ewen, *All Consuming Images*, 248, 79.

40. Michael Silverstein astutely puts his finger on how style is being deployed in U.S. political campaigns: "How does what impresses us as the

very height of *illogic* have a processual 'logic' of its own, such that success-
ful politicians' discourse respects this logic? And where can we see these
processes at work, where 'issues' get lumped and turned into 'message'—
operators available for stylistic fashioning of image? How does a politician
fashion 'message' as a kind of magnet for sometimes randomly assembled
'issues' that clump to it like iron filings arrayed in its magnetic field?"
(*Talking Politics*, 21).

41. Mendoza-Denton, "Key Terms in Language and Culture," 235–36.
Roman Jakobson elegantly analyzes the "pithy style" of the "brief and tena-
cious genre," the Russian proverb, identifying phonological and grammati-
cal features ("Notes on the Makeup of a Proverb"). See also Jakobson's
"Baudelaire's 'Les Chats'" for an analysis of stylistic elements of Baude-
laire's "Les Chats" including rhyme, grammar, gender, phonetics, and se-
mantics. Thanks to Renato Rosaldo for pointing me to these papers.

42. Jakobson categorized most forms of aphasia into two types, "the met-
onymical, concerned with external relations and the metaphorical, involv-
ing internal relations. While each of these two types of aphasia tends toward
unipolarity, normal verbal behavior is bipolar. But any individual use of
language, any verbal style, any trend in verbal art displays a clear predilec-
tion either for the metonymical or for the metaphorical device" (*Studies
on Child Language and Aphasia*), 48.

43. Jakobson, *On Language*, 130. See also Jakobson, "Two Aspects
of Language."

44. I am indebted to James Boon for telling me about Jakobson's work
on style at an early point in my writing.

45. Jakobson, *The Framework of Language*, 106.

46. In his characterization of "schizoid style," Louis Sass is working to-
ward a similar end. Describing the introverted, isolated person with "a
sense of inner dividedness" as "schizoid," Sass differentiates this aspect of
a person from the psychotic condition of "schizophrenia." The "schizoid"
style is a "general style of character or personality that may be found to
any degree and can be present in well-functioning and reasonably healthy
persons. It is a style dominated by a certain hypersensitivity and vulnerabil-
ity and by detachment from both self and world" (*Madness and Modernism*,
100–101). Efforts to characterize a "style" go in a different direction from
efforts to define pathology. Aspects of a style might, by particular criteria,
be pathological. But the style can also be apprehended as a manner of
being, a certain flavor characteristic of a person's way of going through life:

"A particular style of being [involves] certain temperamental or emotional propensities and a distinct set of characteristic conflicts, concerns, and styles of psychological defense" (102).

47. The art historian E. H. Gombrich finds similar kinds of aesthetic patterning in the work of artists: "The personal accent of the artist is not made up of individual tricks of hand which can be isolated and described. It is again a question of relationships, of the interaction of countless personal reactions, a matter of distribution and sequences which we perceive as a whole without being able to name the elements in combination" (*Art and Illusion*, 65–66). This does not stop us from trying: we cannot suppress "the active mind," the "effort after meaning" because it "cannot be defeated without our world's collapsing into total ambiguity" (395). Gombrich is trying to capture something ineffable about style: we perceive it as a whole without being able to name the elements that are combined or to describe exactly how or when they are combined.

48. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 143.

49. Ibid., 146.

50. Merleau-Ponty adds in a footnote that "the mechanics of the skeleton cannot, even at the scientific level, account for the distinctive positions and movements of my body" (*Phenomenology of Perception*, 150).

51. Describing the way rules, customs, habits, and learning come together in complex ways in social life, the anthropologist Veena Das cites a vignette from Michael Gilsenan's ethnography about Lebanon. In the story, a young man performed an act of revenge with a style that, as Gilsenan puts it, included an "archetypal" gesture of indifference to his own safety. Das makes an important point that adds to our understanding of style: to become a man, the young hero had to find his own style of performing a heroic act because this individual style, rather than the enactment of a set part, is what called forth the exclamation from his elders, "You have returned a man!" ("Wittgenstein and Anthropology," 177).

52. As Elias Canetti aptly puts it, "[T]he manic's transformations have a tremendous ease about them" (*Crowds and Power*, 347).

53. My argument here is akin to Ann Stoler's account of colonial regimes, whose authority has been thought to rely on the rule of reason. She argues that Dutch rule in Indonesia also relied on the management of affective states, "public moods," and the racial distribution of sentiments. See Stoler, "Affective States."

Chapter 3

1. See Collier, Maurer, and Suárez-Navaz, "Sanctioned Identities." This article deals specifically with the role of Western legal practice in constituting personhood as ownership of the self and its capacities. D. W. Murray cautions against assuming too quickly that all foundational Western concepts posit an autonomous, unitary self. David Hume himself is cited as a philosopher who posited a noncontinuous, fragmentary self. See Murray, "What Is the Western Concept of the Self?"

2. The will played a large role in John Stuart Mill's mid-nineteenth-century writings about human nature. He thought one could only "overcome the potentially vicious force of habit" by exercising the muscles of the will. This was central to the development of the self and of society: some cultures (such as India and others in the east) remained mired in habit or custom and stasis, but the destructive force of custom could be overcome by the exercise of choice. See Joyce, *The Rule of Freedom*, 118–19.

3. Scull, *Social Order/Mental Disorder*, 286–87.

4. Ibid., 88.

5. Ibid., 86.

6. Jasin, "Considering Off Meds."

7. Icarus, "My Pdoc Emasculated Me."

8. Acoftil, "Neurontin Stories?"

9. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*.

Chapter 4

1. The importance of how linguistic categories are used here cannot be overestimated. Susan Gal states the point succinctly: "The notions of dominance and resistance alert us to the idea that the strongest form of power may well be the ability to define social reality, to impose visions of the world. And such visions are inscribed in language and most important enacted in interaction" ("Language, Gender, and Power," 427).

2. This important concept is Mary Louise Pratt's. See her *Imperial Eyes*, 6–7. It has been usefully developed by James Clifford to understand interactions between museum staff and members of native communities about the interpretation and display of objects in the museums' collections. See his *Routes*, 188–219.

3. Luhrmann, *Of Two Minds,* especially 284–90. As part of my field-work, I sat in on many sessions of a class called Analytic Case Conference, which was designed to train medical residents in psychotherapy. The professor who taught this course and I are jointly writing a paper for publication about the pedagogical similarities between training students to do ethnography and training them to do psychotherapy. For accounts of diagnoses and treatments arrived at through interactions among physicians, nurses, and other staff in a psychiatric ward, see Rhodes, *Emptying Beds.* See also Estroff, *Making It Crazy.*

4. *Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary.* "A heavy sea in which large waves rise and dash upon the coast without apparent cause" (Oxford English Dictionary online).

5. For brevity, I have omitted some parts of the medical histories presented in rounds. These presentations are only a small part of the process of recording a case. Interviews of patient and family, observations by physicians and staff, discussions and reinterpretation are all involved in producing the written records that make up a case. The anthropologist and psychiatrist Robert Barrett has written a detailed and illuminating analysis of how the case record is produced in an Australian psychiatric hospital. See his *Psychiatric Team and the Social Definition of Schizophrenia,* 107–42.

6. Slavoj Žižek reveals the dynamic in this kind of coercion, calling it, in Lacanian terms, the "impotent gaze." See his *Looking Awry,* 72.

7. Rosenberg, "The Tyranny of Diagnosis," 255.

8. Butler, *Bodies That Matter,* 232.

9. Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power,* 2; Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1.*

10. Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power,* 3, 19.

11. Although I am in sympathy with Butler's account, I argue that the strong linguistic emphasis of her account (as indicated by the linguistic terms in the quotes above) creates this trap unnecessarily. For Butler, it is primarily language whose terms provide the conditions for the possibility of social life. Such an emphasis is appropriate, perhaps, given her focus on the logically necessary conditions for social existence. But here I am aiming for an approach to knowledge formation based on "embedded knowledge" that "cannot be deduced from people's talk." See Mol, *The Body Multiple,* 15.

12. Butler, *Bodies That Matter,* 237.

13. Billig, *Freudian Repression,* 140. See also Cameron and Kulick, "Introduction."

14. Gordon, *Ghostly Matters*, 22, 206.

15. Kulick, "No," 141.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. In psychiatry, "poor insight" is considered a common characteristic of psychopathology, especially of schizophrenia. An early discussion of the issue is A. Lewis, "The Psychopathology of Insight." Psychologists have explored the effects of insight on patients' compliance with treatment recommendations and on the outcomes of treatment. See David, "Illness and Insight"; David, "Insight and Psychosis."

20. African Americans' experience with medical experimentation in the early twentieth century, such as in the Tuskegee study, justifies Keith Burton's suspicions. In the Tuskegee study, four hundred poor, mostly illiterate black men were enrolled in a study of the natural history of syphilis. Even after penicillin became available as an effective treatment, the study continued so the researchers could observe the effects of late-stage syphilis. The study only ended in 1972 after a leak to the press. Mr. Burton does state three times that he was terrified of the unknown injections. On the history of the Tuskegee study, see Jones, *Bad Blood*. See also Reverby, *Tuskegee's Truths*.

21. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 60. Emphasis in original.

22. Cameron and Kulick would argue that what is being done in all performatives involves the emergence of a subject. See their "Introduction."

23. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 76.

24. Ibid. Emphasis in original.

25. Ahern, "The Problem of Efficacy," 14.

26. Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 232.

CHAPTER 5

1. Horwitz, *Creating Mental Illness*, 57.

2. Ibid., 60.

3. Ibid., 74.

4. The DSM is required for bureaucratic reasons, but many physicians find it a very imperfect instrument. In my fieldwork, psychiatrists would

informally describe the myriad emotional complexities hidden under the DSM's headings and subheadings in tones of considerable frustration.

5. Latour, *Science in Action*.

6. Horwitz, *Creating Mental Illness*, 57–77, describes in useful detail other factors that influenced the development of DSM-III and its later entrenchment: the role of lay mental health advocacy, increasing development of psychotropic drugs, and increased funds for research into biomedical causes of mental illness.

7. Silverstein and Urban, "The Natural History of Discourse," 1.

8. Rose, *Inventing Our Selves*, 105. Emphasis in original.

9. Ibid.

10. The philosopher Martin Heidegger described the loss of this kind of knowledge as "un-being" or "the abandonment of being." Under the impact of technology in the modern age, he thought that many things come to be seen as resources that can be improved or produced according to machine-like standards of efficiency, losing their connections to contexts of meaning in the process. See Guignon, *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*; Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*.

11. In the Arcades Project, an archive of materials Walter Benjamin collected to elucidate the relationship between the onset of modern commercial developments and culture in nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century Paris, an important theme is the "interior." With the rising importance of the bourgeoisie, novel kinds of domestic architecture and furnishings came into being as domestic life became a secluded shelter from the dangers of the marketplace. In elaborately designed and decorated interiors, new kinds of intimate family life arose. In Benjamin's words, "To live in these interiors was to have woven a dense fabric about oneself, to have secluded oneself within a spider's web, in whose toils world events hang loosely suspended like so many insect bodies sucked dry. From this cavern, one does not like to stir" (*The Arcades Project*, 216). Benjamin refers to the "traces" people left of themselves in these spaces, traces that were left on the surfaces of interior furnishings. Thought about in this light, the proliferation of coverings for furniture—antimacassars—characteristic of the age, can be seen as materials to capture tracings as well as to ward them off. "The interior is not just the universe but also the *étui* [a small, decorated box to hold useful items] of the private individual. To dwell means to leave traces. In the interior, these are accentuated. Coverlets and antimacassars, cases and containers are devised in abundance; in these, the traces

of the most ordinary objects of use are imprinted. In just the same way, the traces of the inhabitant are imprinted in the interior" (9).

12. John Searle, Jacques Derrida, and Judith Butler, among others, have generated a large and contentious literature about the way performatives work. See Searle, *Speech Acts*. (For references to Derrida and Butler, see below.) For anthropological purposes, I think the agreements among these writers are as significant as their differences. For an application to Mayan languages with rich implications for anthropology generally, see Hanks, *Language and Communicative Practices*.

13. Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 51. Emphasis in original.

14. Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 163, 232.

15. Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 163.

16. Of particular interest to anthropologists, a major burden of Austin's book, and of other work in the orbit of the late Wittgenstein, such as G.E.M. Anscombe's *Intention*, was to question the link between the meaning of language and an "inward and spiritual act," an "inward performance." Indeed Anscombe's volume on intention is centrally a detailed exposition of how "intention" and interior mental performances must be disarticulated: "you cannot take any performance (even an interior performance) as itself an act of intention; for if you describe a performance, the fact that it has taken place is not a proof of intention; words for example may occur in somebody's mind without his meaning them. So intention is never a performance in the mind, though in some matters a performance in the mind which is seriously *meant* may make a difference to the correct account of the man's action—e.g., in embracing someone. But the matters in question are necessarily ones in which outward acts are 'significant' in some way" (*Intention*, 49; emphasis in original). The relentless message of both Anscombe's and Austin's work is that the meaning of linguistic acts is not necessarily connected with interior mental events. Even the meaning of mentalistic terms like "intention" does not necessarily entail an interior mental event. Both theorists seek to ground meaning in social use and context, human activities that are public and conventional, governed by communities of language users.

This argument has been downplayed in the subsequent critique in literary theory. Derrida, for example, in his "Signature Event Context" argues that utterances are performative because they are "citations" of previously established social conventions: "Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a 'coded' or iterable utterance, or in other

words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as *conforming* with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a 'citation'?" (18). So far this would not find much resistance in Austin's account of performatives. Derrida goes on to assert that his focus on iterability extends performative language to cases where "intention" is not present. He asserts that for Austin "conscious intention would at the very least have to be totally present and immediately transparent to itself and to others, since it is a determining center [*foyer*] of context" (18). Derrida's shift to iterability allows speech acts to be performative even though "the intention animating the utterance will never be through and through present to itself and to its content" (18). Derrida's quarrel with Austin is in part over the role of the "originating will" in the performative: an utterance like "let there be light" brings something into being through the power of a subject's will. In effect, Derrida asserts that any linguistic sign can be detached from the context in which it was produced and inserted, "cited," in another: "Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written . . . can be *cited*, put between quotation marks; in so doing it can break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable." Derrida loosens the connection Austin wanted to make between performativity and prior social conventions (12). I have found Benjamin Lee's parsing of this argument very helpful. See his *Talking Heads*, 42–65.

17. My research did not delve into the political activities of these organizations, such as the Depression and Related Affective Disorders Association or Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance. Nor did I engage with members of the various organizations within the antipsychiatry or critical psychiatry movements. Outside the United States, a particularly instructive organization is called the Hearing Voices Network. It is an organization of people who "hear voices" in England, Europe, and Australia, which has been described in useful detail in Blackmun, *Hearing Voices*. If one were to think about what it would take for patients to engage vigorously with the terms of medical understanding, a useful comparative case is described by Steven Epstein in *Impure Science*. Epstein chronicles how grassroots publications and treatment activists challenged not only the medical and social services' provision of care for HIV but even the scientific terms in which it was understood. They opened the door to some heretical views of the causation of AIDS and influenced drug development, approval, and pricing.

18. Karp, *Speaking of Sadness*.

19. As the linguistic anthropologist William Hanks puts it, "Where practice approaches break definitively with speech act theory is in their insistence that performative effectiveness does not depend upon the preexistence of conventional speech act types. Instead it is an emergent feature of practice, an unavoidable part of talk under conditions of differential power, authority, and legitimacy" (*Language and Communicative Practices*, 236).

Chapter 6

1. The often unspoken assumption that drugs work on the brain is part of the biomedical model of mental illness that is currently pervasive in the United States. The anthropologist T. M. Luhrmann powerfully articulates a concern that seeing mental illnesses as simply biological will leave patients with a lesser sense of worth. In a simple biomedical model, patients with mental illness are found wanting in the moral core where their rational intention resides. If they are incompletely curable, they will be thereafter less than a fully fledged person. This concern is exacerbated when, in the society as a whole, psychiatric illness comes to be understood only in terms of the biomedical model, at the expense of the interactional terms of psychotherapy. See Luhrmann, *Of Two Minds*, 284–85.

2. For reasons of confidentiality, I have assigned pseudonyms to brand-name drugs on whose accounts my interlocutors worked directly.

3. Francomano, "DTC Advertising: A Matter of Perspective"; Holmer, "Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising Builds Bridges between Patients and Physicians." See also Hollon, "Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Prescription Drugs." This article presents both sides of the debate over whether DTC ads contribute to the public good by informing people of products that can benefit their health, or detract from it by increasing consumption of prescription drugs in ways that do not benefit patients.

4. See "DTC Advertising Spending Increases." Also useful is "Advertising: The Cause of High Drug Costs?" The trade publication *Pharmaceutical Representative* (from which the two above-cited sources are drawn) reported on studies by the National Institute for Health Care Management (NIHCM) Research and Educational Foundation. According to the NIHCM, "Spending on mass media advertising for prescription drugs

reached $1.8 billion in 1999, up from $375 million in 1995. It continued to accelerate in the first four months of 2000, reaching $946 million for the period, 58% more than the $597 million spent during the same four months in 1999" ("DTC Advertising Spending Increases"). Antihistamines took the largest proportion: 10.2 percent of all expenditures on DTC advertising between January and September 2000. See "Spending on Consumer Ads up in 2000."

5. Elsewhere I have discussed the concept of pharmaceutical "side effects" and its impact on patients. See Martin, "The Pharmaceutical Person." Adriana Petryna has shown that the growth in "the number of people participating in and required for pharmaceutical clinical trials has become massive" ("Drug Development and the Ethics of the Globalized Clinical Trial," 5). The side effects Giosa is talking about are discovered through large clinical trials. Many of these new trials are being conducted in low-income countries where people are, therefore, relatively willing to participate in trials for monetary compensation. Moreover, such subjects are much less likely to complain about side effects. Many other forces are also pushing this expansion: the post–World War II boom in production of pharmaceuticals in the United States, the increase in government regulation and oversight of the industry in the United States (including the ban on use of prisoners for clinical trials in the 1970s), and "treatment saturation" in the United States. "Treatment saturation" means that the affluent people in the United States are using so many drugs that drug-drug interactions interfere with the ability to recruit subjects for these trials. Hence, clinical trials have increasingly been conducted outside the United States. For more on clinical trials and other global aspects of pharmaceutical marketing, see Petryna, Lakoff, and Kleinman, *Global Pharmaceuticals*.

6. "Psychotropic Drug Market Grows"; "Prescriptions Soar for Psychotropic Drugs."

7. Pincus et al., "Prescribing Trends in Psychotropic Medications," 526, 529. Figures from 1990 and 1999 are from IMS Health, courtesy of Nikolas Rose.

8. C. Lutz discusses the "inherent irrationality of emotions" in Western cultural categories: their association with danger, chaos, immaturity, vulnerability and lack of control ("Emotion, Thought, and Estrangement," 291–94).

9. Kiki, "James! Help! My Pdoc Doesn't Know about Neurontin."

10. Jamison, Gerner, and Goodwin, "Patient and Physician Attitudes toward Lithium."

11. Jamison, *An Unquiet Mind*, 91–92.

12. Ibid., 6.

13. Marilyn Strathern connects the advantage that is currently gained by specificity in pharmacogenomics to Western cultural concepts of the "whole person" ("The Whole Person and Its Artifacts").

14. "Trying Topamax and Klonopin."

15. "I'm New Heres an Intro [*sic*]."

16. "Cocktail Hour."

17. An employee in a firm to which pharmaceutical companies out-source their publications graciously gave me a password to the forum. The location of the site is confidential.

18. Joseph Dumit gives an illuminating description of the emergence of a notion of "pharmaceutical normalcy," in which health is precarious and can be achieved only through continuous ingestion of multiple drugs. See Dumit, "Drugs for Life."

Chapter 7

1. Raymond Williams used the concept of structures of feeling in order to point beyond formal beliefs or systematic world views to some range of meanings that are "actively lived and felt." Structures of feeling involve "impulse, restraint and tone"; they involve "thought as felt and feeling as thought" (*Marxism and Literature*, 132). For Williams, structures of feel-ing are parts of social experience that are still in process and therefore are not as clearly recognizable as when they are, if they ever are, built into institutions in a formal way. For example, conventionally, early Victorians believed that poverty and debt were caused by deviance and individual failure. Literary figures like Charles Dickens and Emily Brontë developed a new structure of feeling—a sensibility—in their novels by linking pov-erty and debt to the unequal social order instead. This structure of feeling was communicated through emotional relationships in concrete stories rather than in a general theory, and it lay outside conventional under-standings (134).

2. Miklowitz, *The Bipolar Disorder Survival Guide*.

3. Rose, *Inventing Our Selves*, 103.

4. Miller and Goode, *Man and His Body*.

5. This is similar to Bruno Latour's "action at a distance" (*Science in Action*). On accounting schemes, see Miller, "Accounting and Objectiv-ity"; T. Porter, *Trust in Numbers*.

6. The context of this phrase is: "Everything becomes saleable and buyable. The circulation becomes the great social retort into which everything is thrown, to come out again as a gold-crystal. Not even are the bones of saints, and still less are more delicate res sacrosanctae, extra commercium hominum able to withstand this alchemy" (*Capital*, 132).

7. Otniel Dror has done important historical work on the ways emotions became numerically measured by technological devices in the late nineteenth century. When emotion was "numerized," it became knowable scientifically and became positioned inside the language of reason. See Dror, "Counting the Affects."

8. In a wide-ranging review of the history and social effects of the concept of commensuration, Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell L. Stevens trace the first formulation of how commensurability was paired with control, stability, and rationality, while incommensurability was paired with chaos, anxiety, and threat, to Plato's ideas from the fifth and early fourth centuries BC. See Espeland and Stevens, "Commensuration as a Social Process." They draw on Martha Nussbaum's argument that Plato needed to make ethical values commensurate so that they could be ranked. Once people could rank their values, they could make rational choices among them and avoid following the pull of irrational passions. Aristotle, in contrast, questioned the goal of rendering value general and homogenous and preferred to retain the value of things and people for their own sakes. Nussbaum, "Plato on Commensurability and Desire."

9. Kraepelin, *Manic-Depressive Insanity and Paranoia*, 140.

10. Ibid., 149.

11. Hoff, "Kraepelin: Clinical Sections, I," 269.

12. Engstrom, "Kraepelin: Social Section," 294.

13. Berrios and Hauser, "Clinical Sections," 281.

14. Kraepelin, *One Hundred Years of Psychiatry*, 151.

15. Kraepelin, *Manic-Depressive Insanity and Paranoia*, 151.

16. Kraepelin, *Clinical Psychiatry*, 414.

17. Ibid.

18. At one time, the NIMH Web site solicited participation in ongoing NIMH studies of mood disorders.

19. The Mood Tree is not exclusively for children and is not marketed exclusively to parents, but rather to all ages from six years old and up, including adolescents and adults. The different versions have somewhat different terms on the apples.

20. McDonald, *The Judy Moody Mood Journal*.

21. Mohammed, "A Mood Chart System." I am focusing primarily on mood charts that people come upon or seek out on their own. There is another form of mood charting, in use for nearly a decade, used in large-scale studies of the efficacy of medications for mood disorders. In these studies, based on a retrospective or prospective "Life-Chart Method," patients are recruited and enrolled for the specific purpose of having their affective states charted, or learning how to chart them themselves. See Denicoff et al., "Validation of the Prospective NIMH-Life-Chart Method"; bipolar news, "What Is Life Charting?"

22. Mondimore, *Bipolar Disorder*, 222.

23. Sartorius, "Depressive Disorders," 1.

24. The film was produced by the Canadian Broadcasting Company. A copy is held in the History of Medicine Division of the National Library of Medicine.

25. Healy, *The Antidepressant Era*, 76.

26. Tanouye, "Mental Illness: A Rising Workplace Cost."

27. Stewart et al., "Cost of Lost Productive Work Time among U.S. Workers with Depression."

28. The sociologist Alain Ehrenberg traces the historical entailments between depression as an emerging psychiatric category and French concepts of action and inaction. See Ehrenberg, *La fatigue d'être soi*.

29. "Depressed and on Welfare."

30. The actual path walked by patients who take SSRIs, which might begin with relief, progress to tolerance, and end with new modes of actualizing the self, is far more complex than advertisements convey. For an analysis of first-person accounts of this path, see Metzl, *Prozac on the Couch*, 174–94.

31. Kramer, "There's Nothing Deep about Depression."

32. Lewis and the Illinois Leader, *Illinois Launches Compulsory Mental Health Screening for Children and Pregnant Women*; Medical Condition News, "Texas Medication Algorithm Project Guidelines Produce Improvements in Patients with Major Depressive Disorder." For information on other whistle blowers who have filed charges that the pharmaceutical industry used inappropriate means to promote psychotropic drugs, see the Web site of the Alliance for Human Research Protection at http://www.ahrp.org/infomail/04/07/07.php.

33. Sher, *Live the Life You Love*, 54.

34. This is not entirely new. In *White Collar* (1951), C. Wright Mills described how in twentieth-century salesmanship, traits found in creative salesmen were "expropriated": codified and displayed in a controlled way. Quoted in Ewen, *All Consuming Images*.

35. Warren Sussman showed that late nineteenth-century advice books described the self as based on character, moral integrity that could be improved through hard work, moral behavior, and frugality. After the turn of the twentieth century, advice books focused on personality, a quality that one shaped by making oneself attractive to others. Francesca Bordogna analyzes William James's thesis about the temperament and its link to the physiological constitution of the individual in "The Psychology and Physiology of Temperament."

36. Friedman, "What's the Lure of the Edge?" F7.

37. MacLennan, "The Global CNS Therapeutics Markets."

38. I am echoing Pierre Bourdieu's phraseology in *Distinction*. He describes how rationalization in the school system in France replaces "practical schemes of classification" with "explicit, standardized taxonomies." These typologies are deliberately taught and therefore fixed in memory as knowledge that can be "reproduced in virtually identical form by all the agents subjected to its action" (67).

39. This point is made powerfully by Nikolas Rose in a number of important publications. See, for example, Rose, "Becoming Neurochemical Selves," and *Governing the Soul*.

40. Historically, the collection of statistics has played a key role in enabling new regimes of control to arise. For the role of statistics in colonial regimes, see Anderson, *Imagined Communities*. On the "looping effects" of categories of human kinds, see Hacking, "Making up People."

41. Miller, "Accounting and Objectivity," 79.

42. Mohammed, "A Mood Chart System."

43. In an analogous process, when a specific form of labor is transformed through abstraction from something with use value into something with exchange value, it also becomes social. Marx explained how the specific labor of tailoring a coat could become equivalent to the very different specific labor of weaving linen. First, the concrete labor of tailoring becomes "directly identified with undifferentiated human labour," which is measured by labor time. This makes tailoring "identical with any other sort of labour" including the labor of weaving linen. Although tailoring, like all labor that produces commodities, is "the labour of private individuals

. . . yet, at the same time, it ranks as labour directly social in its character. . . . The labour of private individuals takes the form of its opposite, labour directly social in its form" (*Capital*, 1014).

44. "Moral Thermometer."

45. Another version of the thermometer, published as the frontispiece of one of Rush's books, was divided into an upper section titled "Temperance" and a lower one called "Intemperance." Drinking only water and milk would lead to "health, wealth, serenity of mind, reputation, long life and happiness." Drinking anything more potent than strong punch would lead to vices (idleness, quarreling, anarchy), diseases (gout, melancholy, madness), and punishments (debt, hunger, workhouse, jail). Rush, *An Inquiry into the Effects of Ardent Spirits upon the Human Body and Mind*.

46. "Moral Thermometer," 5–6.

Chapter 8

1. Thanks to David Harvey for telling me about Keynes's animal spirits.

2. For one example, see Berresem, "Emotions Flattened and Scattered." Others have laid postmodernity's pervasive emotional emptiness at the feet of the social forces of capitalism, which, requiring continuous growth under intense competition and ruthless entrepreneurialism for survival, have made catastrophic job loss a normal experience for increasing numbers of people. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*.

3. According to Henry Ellenberger's history of psychoanalysis, the metaphor of colonizing the mind has been used before for new psychiatric discoveries. In France, Mesmer (1734–1815) developed an early form of dynamic psychotherapy to replace exorcism. Because his method explored the mind itself rather than exorcising foreign spirits from it, he was compared to Columbus (*Discovery of the Unconscious*, 57). Charcot, the French doctor who displayed and treated hysteria at Salpetriere in the 1880s, used hypnotism to show the symptoms were not produced by lesions of the nervous system. He was called the "Napoleon of neuroses" (95). In her study of Madagascar, Lesley Sharp has used the notion of the colonized mind. See *The Sacrificed Generation*.

4. Sass, *Madness and Modernism*, 80.

5. Kretschmer, *Physique and Character*, 129–30.

6. Sass, *Madness and Modernism*, 4–982.

7. Lunbeck, *The Psychiatric Persuasion*, 146.

8. Kraus, "How Can the Phenomenological-Anthropological Approach Contribute to Diagnosis and Classification in Psychiatry?" 208.

9. Lunbeck, *The Psychiatric Persuasion*, 146.

10. Southard and Jarrett, *The Kingdom of Evils*, 477. Making a virtue of these traits for psychological studies, the German psychologist Sophus Thalbitzer wrote in 1926 that he regarded manic-depressive patients as "the best material for the study of normal processes of feeling." He argued that in manic depression, normal moods and emotions are strongly defined and magnified: "We see them as if under the microscope with each characteristic feature standing out in bold relief; we can observe the mood-psychosis as a natural mood or feeling raises, as it were to a higher power" (*Emotion and Insanity*, 43).

Ernst Kretschmer reiterated Southard's affection for the manic-depressive type: "The individuals in the region of manic-depressive madness are prevailingly sociable, good-natured men, people with whom one can get on well, who understand a joke, and who take life as it comes. They give themselves naturally and openly, and one soon makes friends with them; they have often something soft and warm in their temperaments" (*Physique and Character*, 124).

11. Kraus, "Identity and Psychosis of the Manic-Depressive," 203. In this and the following article, Kraus provides a wealth of references to earlier work in psychology and psychoanalysis on the conformist attitudes of manic-depressive patients (206–7). See Kraus, "Role Performance, Identity Structure and Psychosis in Melancholic and Manic-Depressive Patients." A 1979 study of multigenerational bipolar illness in families also stressed the unrealistic standards of conformity subscribed to in the families studied. See Davenport, "Manic-Depressive Illness," 25.

12. Kraus, "Identity and Psychosis of the Manic-Depressive," 205–6.

13. In his memoir, Andrew Solomon describes the social withdrawal depression brings: "[M]ajor depression has a number of defining factors—mostly having to do with withdrawal, though agitated or atypical depression may have an intense negativity rather than a flattened passivity—and is usually fairly easy to recognize; it deranges sleep, appetites, and energy. It tends to increase sensitivity to rejection, and it may be accompanied by a loss of self-confidence and self-regard" (*The Noonday Demon*, 48).

14. Kretschmer describes further how people react to the mania of a manic depressive: "It is well known that even manics in a state of excitement have usually something childishly good-natured, trustful, and tractable about them, they are far more up to mischief then harsh acts of violence, they seldom make a serious attempt to do anyone any harm; they just flare up all of a sudden but they are soon quiet again; one can seldom take anything they do in bad part. And the pure typical circular depressives

have some soft quality in their moodiness" (*Physique and Character*, 129). The topic is beyond my scope, but it would be instructive to consider the narcissistic elements in mania. Inflated self-esteem is listed as one of the defining terms of mania in the DSM, indicating that there is a family resemblance between mania and narcissism. Research suggests there might well be comorbidity between manic depression and narcissistic personality disorder, as in Crockford and el-Guebaly, "Psychiatric Comorbidity in Pathological Gambling." Considered not just as a bundle of traits but as a loosely integrated style, however, narcissism conveys more of a sense of social isolation and inner emptiness than mania: it might well elicit a lower "empathic index" than mania. For a perceptive account of narcissism as a style, see Johnson, *Humanizing the Narcissistic Style*. For an important study of the history of narcissism as a concept in psychiatry and a cultural preoccupation in the United States, see Lunbeck, *The Americanization of Narcissism*.

15. Sass traces critically and with care the use of this definition of creativity by Kay Jamison and in psychology generally. See Sass, "Schizophrenia, Modernism, and the 'Creative Imagination,'" 59, 65–67.

16. No one has done more than Louis Sass to elucidate the specific phenomenological features of the schizophrenic condition, such as "unworlding." See in particular Sass, *The Paradoxes of Delusion*.

17. Sass, "Schizophrenia, Modernism, and the 'Creative Imagination,'" 70.

18. Gibbons, *Sights Unseen*; Padgett, *A Child of Silence*; Willocks, *Green River Rising*; MTV "True Life: I'm Bipolar," July 2002; PBS special about Lance in the *American Family* series; Duke and Hochman, *A Brilliant Madness*; Graham, *Personal History*; Gray, *Life Interrupted*; Pauley, *Skywriting*.

19. A rough indication of the rise in frequency of mania as a term in ordinary life is a count of the incidence of the term in *the New York Times* from 1870 to 1999. The *New York Times* printed the term "mania" about a thousand times per decade from 1870 to 1979. In the next two decades, the rate increased threefold, to about three thousand times per decade (ProQuest Historical Newspapers index and ProQuest New York Times index).

20. A particularly useful list is provided in the Internet encyclopedia Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_people_believed_to_have_been_affected_by_bipolar_disorder.

21. In my fieldwork with pharmaceutical marketers and representatives, I learned that such gaps are not uncommon. Messages developed at one

point—say by a firm to whom a pharmaceutical corporation subcontracted a marketing account—might be lost by the time the materials and their imagery were in the hands of sales representatives. But at the 2000 APA meeting, another pharmaceutical company, Abbott Laboratories, distributed a special compilation of classical music on a CD as a gift. The CD included music by Beethoven, Tchaikovsky, Mozart, and other composers often listed as artistic geniuses who suffered from manic depression. I spoke at some length with the Abbott representative who gave me a copy of the CD, as we stood surrounded by glowing posters that advertised Depakote's advantages for the treatment of manic depression. Looking at the musicians included on the CD, I asked him if they were included because they had all had manic depression. He looked surprised: not only did he not know, but he said he had never thought of the possibility.

22. Schiff, "Poor Richard's Redemption."

23. Ser Vaas, "The *Post* Investigates Manic-Depression."

24. Busfield and Campling, *Men, Women, and Madness*, 122.

25. Lunbeck, *The Psychiatric Persuasion*, 149. C. Lutz provides a useful overview of the associations between emotions and the female in American culture ("Emotion, Thought, and Estrangement").

26. Lunbeck, *The Psychiatric Persuasion*, 149. Charles Nuckolls writes about nineteenth-century cultural stereotypes of the "independent" male and the "dependent" female that were congruent with and affected the development of other psychiatric diagnoses—the antisocial personality and the histrionic personality ("Toward a Cultural History of the Personality Disorders").

27. Schnog, "Changing Emotions," 99.

28. Lunbeck, *The Psychiatric Persuasion*, 150.

29. Goodwin and Jamison, *Manic-Depressive Illness*, 168.

30. Jamison, *An Unquiet Mind*, 122–23.

31. Ibid., 122.

32. Corrigan, *Business of the Heart*, 243.

33. Ibid., 241–43.

34. Pfister, "Glamorizing the Psychological," 190.

35. Walser, "Deep Jazz," 274.

36. Ibid., 274–75.

37. Cardinal, *The Words to Say It*, 39.

38. Morrison, *Playing in the Dark*, vi, viii.

39. Rack, *Race, Culture, and Mental Disorder*, 113.

40. Ibid., 115, 116.

41. Ibid. Elizabeth Lunbeck's history of early twentieth-century American psychiatry details the relationship between the race theory of the time and psychiatric diagnosis. By and large, these early psychiatrists accepted the notion of racial differences in temperament, but did not use racial differences to impute pathology. Racial stereotypes were used instead to describe individuals—an alcoholic Irishman or a nervous Jew—as normal for their race (*The Psychiatric Persuasion*, 125–26). Baldwin, *Notes of a Native Son*, 53, and Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 126ff., provide some classic articulations of the cultural link between black men and out-of-control emotion.

42. "Famous People Who Have Suffered from Depression or Manic-Depression." This extensive list includes Jim Carrey but not Eddie Murphy.

43. Jamison, *An Unquiet Mind*, 213.

44. Jamison, *Touched with Fire*, 105.

45. Goodwin and Jamison, *Manic-Depressive Illness*, 23.

46. Jamison, *An Unquiet Mind*, 80.

47. Mark Micale shows how the style of hysterics was extended as an aesthetic form into the theater in late nineteenth-century France ("Discourses of Hysteria in Fin-de-Siècle France," 76–77).

48. This last scenario may not be mere speculation. See Baard, "The Guilt-Free Soldier."

49. Grigoriadis, "Are You Bipolar?"

50. Ibid.

51. For a Canadian news story, see Evenson, "Is 'Soft' Depression Price of Greatness?" This article quotes a Canadian psychiatrist saying that people with hypomania are "highly functioning people. They're effervescent, energetic, optimistic and charismatic. There are people who get lots done; they are oftentimes artistically gifted as well and are major contributors to society."

52. Grigoriadis, "Are You Bipolar?"

53. Kluger, Song, and Simon, "Young and Bipolar."

54. Carlson, "Mania and ADHD," and Klein, Pine, and Klein, "Debate Forum," question the extrapolation of adult criteria onto children. Bowring and Kovacs, "Difficulties in Diagnosing Manic Disorders among Children and Adolescents," 613, raise the difficulty of identifying psychotic thinking in children with active imaginations.

55. One epidemiological study estimates the lifetime prevalence of bipolar disorders among young American adults at 1.6 percent. Jonas et al., "Prevalence of Mood Disorders in a National Sample of Young American Adults."

56. Kluger, Song, and Simon, "Young and Bipolar," 43.

57. Braun, "The Challenge of Being Young, Creative and Bipolar."

58. "The Storm in My Brain."

59. "Treating Bipolar Disorder Takes Understanding," *New York Times*, October 26, A21, October 31, A7, November 1, A15. This ad ran at least eight times between October 26 and December 7, 2005.

60. For some of the press coverage of this genre, termed "a new critical genre that likens society to a mental patient," see Lacher, "In New Book, Professor Sees a 'Mania' in U.S. for Possessions and Status," 7.

61. Jamison, *Exuberance*, 289.

62. Gartner, *The Hypomanic Edge*.

63. Whybrow, *American Mania*.

64. It follows that existing and forthcoming studies of the different meanings given to psychological states and psychotropic drugs across cultures are crucial additions to our understanding of mania and depression in Western societies. For classic studies, see Crapanzano, *Tuhami*; Kleinman, *Social Origins of Distress and Disease*; Levy, *Tahitians*; Wikan, "Public Grace and Private Fears." For recent or forthcoming studies, see Good and DelVecchio-Good, "Why Do the Masses So Easily Run Amok?"; A. Lakoff, *Pharmaceutical Reason*; Wilce, "Madness, Fear, and Control in Bangladesh." See also Michael Oldani's Princeton dissertation, "Filling Scripts."

65. Anscombe, *Intention*; Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul*, 235.

66. Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul*, 237.

67. Ibid.

68. Of course, earlier conceptions of multiplicity also had a history: "[T]he whole language of many selves had been hammered out by generations of romantic poets and novelists, great and small, and also in innumerable broadsheets and feuilletons too ephemeral for general knowledge today" (Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul*, 232).

69. In a more recent publication, Hacking softens his criticism of retroactive diagnosis, still finding it academically incorrect but allowing that it is sometimes nonetheless able to yield insight. People called "fugueurs" (mad travelers) at the end of the nineteenth century may share something with contemporary people who suffer from what is now called "disassociative fugue," for example. See Hacking, *Mad Travelers*, 87.

70. "Ron Chernow, Author *Alexander Hamilton*."

71. In anthropology there has been only a modest amount of recent interest in the implications of Wittgenstein's thought for the understanding of cultural processes. This interest is not entirely new—Clifford Geertz's work has long been informed by Wittgensteinian understandings—but it is a welcome sign. See Das, "Wittgenstein and Anthropology." Also, Michael Lynch has recently developed some implications of Wittgenstein's views of language for science studies in his "Representation Is Overrated." By the accident of being in graduate school at Cornell during the years when the faculty in the philosophy department were undergoing a kind of conversion experience as they contended with the unpublished writings Wittgenstein left there before his death, I was swept along in their enthusiasm. I took courses from Max Black, Georg Von Wright, and Bruce Goldberg. Many of my early publications were attempts to see anthropological problems, or dissolve them, with the aid of insights I had gained from this work. In returning to these concerns here, I want to signal the richness of Wittgenstein's thought for anthropological accounts of culture.

72. Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, 2e.

73. Ibid., 8e. Emphasis in original.

Chapter 9

1. J. Chaffin, "How Brokers with the Blues May Add to Market Miseries."

2. Kaletsky, "War against Terror Can Be Fought on the Spending Front."

3. Samuelson, "For the Economy, Mood Does Matter." Emphasis added.

4. Roper, "Consumers Anxious but Ads Bring Some Comfort."

5. Kaplan, "Study: Consumers Anxious but Ads Bring Some Comfort."

6. World Mood Chart.

7. Up until the fall of 2004, Benrik's chart plotted the world mood against the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The software was not working properly, so that feature was removed (e-mail correspondence, September 4, 2004). The moods of investors are at least as important as the moods of stockbrokers, CEOs, and consumers. In 2003, State Street Associates launched a global investor confidence index that measures the "sentiments" of institutional investors by tracking the percentage of their portfolios that they place in high-risk assets. The basic idea, according to the

firm, is that "the more of their portfolios that professional investors are willing to devote to riskier as opposed to safer investments, the greater their risk appetite or confidence." State Street Investor, "State Street Investor Confidence Index Summary."

8. Havens, *Making Contact*, 21.

9. In Andrew Solomon's eloquent description of the slowing that accompanies depression, "Depression minutes are like dog years, based on some artificial notion of time. I can remember lying frozen in bed, crying because I was too frightened to take a shower, and at the same time knowing that showers are not scary. I kept running through the individual steps in my mind: you turn and put your feet on the floor; you stand; you walk from here to the bathroom; you open the bathroom door; you walk to the edge of the tub; you turn on the water; you step under the water; you rub yourself with soap; you rinse; you step out; you dry yourself; you walk back to the bed. Twelve steps, which sounded to me then as onerous as a tour through the stations of the cross" (*The Noonday Demon*, 52–53).

Karl Jaspers, a brilliant clinician of the twentieth century, describes the immobility of depression in connection with the fear of economic loss: "*Pure depression* is the opposite of this [mania] in every respect. Its central core is formed from an equally unmotivated and profound sadness to which is added a retardation of psychic events, which is as subjectively painful as it is objectively visible. All instinctual activities are subjected to it. The patient does not want to do anything. The reduced impulse to move and do things turns into complete immobility. No decision can be made and no activity begun. Associations are not available. Patients have no ideas. They complain of a complete disruption of memory. They feel their poverty of performance and complain of their inefficiency, lack of emotion and emptiness. They feel profound gloom as a sensation in the chest or body as if it could be laid hold of there. The depth of their melancholy makes them see the world as grim and grey. They look for the unfavourable and unhappy elements in everything. They accuse themselves of much past guile (self-accusations, notions of having sinned). The present has nothing for them (notions of worthlessness) and the future lies horrifyingly before them (notions of poverty, etc.)" (*General Psychopathology*, 2:597).

10. Denby, *American Sucker*, 7–8.

11. Zürn, *The Man of Jasmine and Other Texts*, 43.

12. Behrman, *Electroboy*, 80.

13. Cramer, *Confessions of a Street Addict*, 92, 124.

14. Bandler, "Can Your Workers Carry a Bowling Ball with a Rubber Band?"

15. The theme of deliberately inducing mania has also been picked up at the grassroots level. On the Web site of the Icarus Project, a forum for people living under the description of bipolar disorder, there is a thread within an online discussion forum that is devoted to inducing mania. The discussion covers possible methods—sleep less, increase caffeine, alter diet—interwoven with plenty of caution about trying to induce mania at all. The Icarus Project was founded to "provide a place to discuss and connect around the paradox of 'navigating the space between brilliance and madness.'" The specific link to the discussion thread is http://www.theicarusproject.net/community/discussionboards/viewtopic.php?t=5048.

16. Denby, "The Quarter of Living Dangerously."

17. As depicted impressionistically in the film *Enron* and captured successfully by firms like Thrillseekers Unlimited, corporations are big customers of extreme sports adventures. Friedman, "What's the Lure of the Edge?"

18. Sutton, "The Weird Rules of Creativity."

19. Ibid., 102.

20. Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*, 161–62.

21. Koppl, "Retrospectives: Animal Spirits," describes how animal spirits worked for Keynes; Moggridge, "Correspondence," has the evidence that Keynes was drawing upon Descartes' notions of fiery particles in the blood that move the nerves and muscles.

22. In psychology, there have been careful assessments of what is called "optimistic bias" as it might differ between schizophrenic patients and healthy comparison subjects. Optimistic bias occurs when a person (unrealistically) evaluates his or her likelihood to experience adverse events as lower than others'. In one study, the healthy comparison subjects showed a greater degree of optimistic bias (and therefore a greater degree of unrealistic judgment) than the schizophrenic patients did. See Prentice, Gold, and Carpenter, "Optimistic Bias in the Perception of Personal Risk." I have not been able to locate any comparative study of bipolar patients in a manic phase, but these experimental results could be taken to suggest that "normal" Americans are unrealistically optimistic.

23. See "Mood Swings and Downswings," 2002, Economist.com.

24. Greider, *One World, Ready or Not*, 227–28.
25. Uchitelle, "Confusion as an Economic Indicator," 1.
26. R. Abelson, "A Sudden Breakout of Mad-Bull Disease," C1.
27. Magnier, "Dramatic Surge in Japan's Yen Spurs New Fear."
28. T. Walker, "Market Cools Down While the Weather Heats Up," F1.
29. Gillmor, "High-Tech High-Fliers Get Hit Hard," E1.
30. Kahn, "The Markets: Market Place."
31. Denby, *American Sucker*, 111.
32. Cramer, *Confessions of a Street Addict*.
33. Glassman, "Psyching out Mr. Market."
34. Mann, "Mr. Market Is a Manic-Depressive Idiot."
35. Ignatius, "Our Bipolar Economy."
36. "Barclays Capital Newsletter." Economists such as Richard Thaler or Robert Schiller try to preserve the rationality of markets by seeing the source of markets' irrationality in the irrational emotions of the populace. In *Irrational Exuberance*, Schiller relies on the influence of newspapers and other mass information technology, together with psychological factors such as overconfidence and magical thinking, to explain the contemporary speculative bubble. He sees market highs and lows as inevitable: "We cannot completely protect society from the effects of waves of irrational exuberance or irrational pessimism—emotional reactions that are themselves part of the human condition" (142–43). This work is attracting attention in the mainstream press. The *New York Times* reported on Thaler's approach: "Rejecting the narrow, mechanical *homo economicus* that serves as a basis for neoclassical theory, [Richard] Thaler proposed that most people actually behave like . . . people! They are prone to error, irrationality and emotion, and they act in ways not always consistent with maximizing their own financial well being" (Lowenstein, "Exuberance Is Rational," 68, 70). Thaler's work, called behavioral economics, ties research in behaviorist psychology with economic decisions and judgments. In so far as it is a dissenting view in economics that is gaining currency, one that places irrational emotion at the center of human economic behavior, it is relevant to our changing cultural understanding of the nature and source of irrationality. The awarding of the Nobel Prize to behavioral economist Daniel Kahneman in 2002 has driven an additional wedge into the assumptions of rational choice economics.
37. Farrell, "Capitalism's 'Animal Spirits' Endure."
38. Griffin, "Looking for the Prevailing Wind."

39. From a writer who looks back at the breaking of the mania come some reasons for how things got so irrational: "This mania can only end the way all prior manias have ended—with public distrust of the very professionals that coerced them into the madness in the first place. . . . By its very definition, a mania is a time of widespread hysteria and faulty rationales. However, in order to believe, investors have to be convinced that there is a rational basis to their actions. This can only occur when certain participants are able to devise untruths and cajole the public" (A. Newman, "Pictures of a Stock Market Mania").

40. Dash, *Tulipomania*.

41. Ibid., 217.

42. Tobias, *Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds*, x–xi.

43. Kindleberger, *Manias, Panics and Crashes*, 1.

44. Ibid., 23.

45. Ibid., 20. Business writers frequently invoke this set of books to shed light on the contemporary oscillations in market value. Smith, "All's Well That Ends Like Tulip Mania."

46. Both Adam Smith and Condorcet were preoccupied with economic sentiments: "The essential disposition of moral life, for Condorcet as for Smith, is to think oneself into the feelings of other people; to feel sympathy. This is similar, in its reflexiveness, to the disposition of economic life. To think about economic decisions is to think about how other people think." The writings of Smith and Condorcet were concerned with how social order could be assured if individuals made their own decisions in the marketplace without overarching controls from a government. Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*, 224. For a nuanced discussion of the eighteenth-century emergence of the notion of "interests," a hybrid condition between the "passions" and "reason," see Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests*, 42–48.

47. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History*, 112–13.

48. Ibid., 114.

49. Corrigan, *Business of the Heart*, 62.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., 229.

52. Ibid., 253–54.

53. Ibid., 128.

54. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History*, 114.

55. Rosenbaum and Seligman, *Abnormal Psychology*, 403.

56. Gay, "PBS' New Film about Theodore Roosevelt Chronicles the Many Sides of a Passionate, Energetic Man."

57. PBS, *Shackleton's Voyage of Endurance*.

58. Salamon, "Shackleton Marches On."

59. Capparell, "Explorers: Get Ready for Shackleton-Mania."

60. Capparell, "In the Lead."

61. MacFarquhar, "The Gilder Effect," 121–22.

62. Farnham, "Crazy and in Charge." Charles Nuckolls analyzes the categories in the DSM in terms of the premium American culture places on flamboyant self-dramatization as an extreme form of independence (*Culture*, 205–6).

63. Fineman, "Rove at War"; Amelio, *On the Firing Line*; Kitchen, "Using Heels-over-Heads Approach at Conference."

Elsewhere in the global corporate world, too, business leaders are turning up as virile manics. In a news story in the *Canadian Business* magazine, one that was well-known among my fieldwork interlocutors, Pierre Karl Péladeau, CEO of the Montreal-based global communications company Quebecor, was said to have "the CEO's Disease." Péladeau had gone public about his diagnosis of manic depression, and the article placed him in the company of "the most colorful and ambitious business professionals of our times" for whom manic depression had been a "driving force." In addition, he shared a place beside the magazine's "Peers of the Abyss" sidebar, featuring Winston Churchill, Ted Turner, and Canadian business leaders Robert Campeau and Murray Pezim. But when Péladeau first recognized himself in the descriptions of manic depression in Ronald Fieve's book *Moodswing*, he was not pleased. "I hated it; I would have preferred a heart attack. I thought it was a woman's illness" (Tillson, "The CEO's Disease"). Other international magnates seem to revel in the zaniness of their image. Richard Branson, the British founder of the Virgin Group, is called "the flamboyant CEO," (1) who is "charismatic and competitive" with a "skillfully controlled aggressive streak," a "rock and roll businessman," (2) who combines "cunning, naivety [*sic*] and manic competitiveness," (3) and has "manic-looking eyes" (4) and "manic energy" (5). Citations are as follows: (1) Nandwani, "The Flamboyant CEO"; (2) Ligerakis, "The Challenger: Richard Branson"; (3) Rawnsley, "Review of 'Richard Branson; the Inside Story' by Mick Brown"; (4) "No More Branson Nonsense"; (5) Ellen, "Why Richard Branson's Number Is Up."

64. Walker, "Conscience Undercover."

65. Kingston, "Minding Martha's Business."

66. Grant, *Minding Mr. Market*, xxi.

67. Arora, "Market Movers: Mood Swings."

68. Harvey, *Spaces of Hope*, 154.

69. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*.

70. W. Brown, "Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy"; Lemke, "'The Birth of Biopolitics.'"

71. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, 3.

72. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 281.

73. Walter Benjamin's Arcades Project contains much that develops Weber's insights on this point. Benjamin contested the claim—often mistakenly attributed to Weber—that modernity, bringing the complete triumph of abstract, formal reason in many major institutions and cultural forms, led to the disenchantment of the world. Benjamin thought that even though social and cultural institutions had become rationalized in form, cultural life became reenchanted with irrational content from dream images and mythical figures. He showed that "underneath the surface of increasing systemic rationalization, on an unconscious 'dream' level, the new urban-industrial world had become fully reenchanted. In the modern city, as in the ur-forests of another era, the 'threatening and alluring face' of myth was alive and everywhere. It peered out of wall posters advertising 'toothpaste for giants,' and whispered its presence in the most rationalized urban plans that, 'with their uniform streets and endless rows of buildings, have realized the dreamed-of architecture of the ancients: the labyrinth.' It appeared, prototypically, in the arcades, where 'the commodities are suspended and shoved together in such boundless confusion, that [they appear] like images out of the most incoherent dreams.'" Buck-Morss notes perceptively that Weber actually did appreciate the persistence of the irrational in modern life (*The Dialectics of Seeing*, 254).

74. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 88.

75. Ibid., 182.

76. Scaff, *Fleeing the Iron Cage*, 88.

77. Goldman, *Max Weber and Thomas Mann*, 28–29.

78. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 54–55.

79. Ibid., quoted in Goldman, *Max Weber and Thomas Mann*, 29.

80. Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 136.

81. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 137.

82. Ibid., 136.

83. Fieve, *Moodswing*, 24.

84. Jamison, *An Unquiet Mind*, 74.

85. Ho, "Liquefying Corporations and Communities."

86. Gusterson, *Nuclear Rites*, 111.

87. Kraepelin, *One Hundred Hears of Psychiatry*.

88. Rosenberg, "The Tyranny of Diagnosis," 250.

89. Painton, "The Taming of Ted Turner."

90. Auletta, "The Lost Tycoon."

91. The mortality rate for untreated manic-depressive patients is higher than it is for most types of heart disease and many types of cancer. At least 20 percent of deaths among manic-depressive patients are "secondary to suicide." Goodwin and Jamison, *Manic-Depressive Illness*, 227, 228.

92. In addition, in many cultures, wrongful death, incomplete burial, suicide, and other socially anomalous events in which life and death collide often produce restless ghosts in their wake. See Hertz, *Death and the Right Hand*; Mueggler, *The Age of Wild Ghosts*.

93. In Roland Barthes' terms, this is a "punctum." I am indebted here to Gordon's *Ghostly Matters*.

94. "Pocket Quiz," Diversions, April 7, 2002, available from http://www.economist.com/diversions/pocketquiz.

95. "Barclays Capital Newsletter."

96. Cultural critic Slavoj Žižek explains that to be willing to die for some cause is to have the "very excess of life." This means terrorists are fascinating because they are "more alive" than others and it means the way to defeat terrorists is to become as alive as they are. Under this logic, a war in which American citizens die is the simplest way for the nation to demonstrate its excess of life. Žižek is not condoning terrorism: as Walter Benn Michaels clarifies, "the question of whether we are doing the right thing has been redescribed as the question of whether we are living our lives to the fullest (whether we're as alive as the suicide bombers.)" Žižek, *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*, 103, quoted in Michaels, *The Shape of the Signifier*, 176.

Conclusion

1. Psychologists have studied "depressive realism," a pattern in which, under experimental conditions, depressed people judge their control over events more accurately than nondepressed people do (Teasdale and Barnard, *Affect, Cognition and Change*). Recent evidence has complicated

the picture by showing that depressed people take fewer factors into account when assessing their ability to control experimental events. On these findings, depressed people actually make less accurate judgments than those who are not depressed (Msetfi et al., "Depressive Realism and Outcome Density Bias in Contingency Judgments"). These results are intriguing, but the experimental situation (turning on a lightbulb that only works part of the time) is a long way from the larger issues I am considering, such as assessing the quality of social life in the United States.

2. Huxley, *Brave New World*, 78.

3. Ibid., 92.

4. Stevenson, "Aftermath," 4.

5. Ibid.

6. McManamy, *McMan's Depression and Bipolar Weekly*.

7. Clark, "On the Brink of War."

8. New York Times Editorial, "The Best-Selling Post-Mortem."

9. Abelson, "Bad News Bulls."

10. Ibid.

11. In 2003, the New School in New York City ran a public relations campaign on billboards for the continuous education they provide, lest one fall behind in the Darwinist struggle for survival. In 2005 Microsoft rolled out a print and Web media campaign for upgrades to Office 2003. The ads depict dinosaur-headed humans who begin to realize that they have been working in a bygone era left behind by others who have already evolved with the help of the upgrade. See http://www.microsoft.com/office/evolve/default.mspx (accessed June 20, 2005).

12. Greenhouse, "The Mood at Work," provides statistics on the level of anger, pessimism, and anxiety among Americans who are working, in contrast to the characteristic ebullience of the 1990s.

13. Brooks, "More Than Money," A23.

14. Ibid.

15. This passage is often misunderstood because of the misleading translation in the popular "Gerth and Mills" English edition of Weber's writings: "An unsere Arbeit gehen und der 'Forderung des Tages' gerecht warden—menschlich sowohl wie beruflich. Die aber ist schlicht und einfach, wenn jeder den Dämon findet und ihm gehorcht, der seines Lebens Fäden halt" is translated there, "We shall set to work and meet the 'demands of the day,' in human relations as well as in our vocation. This, however, is plain and simple, if each finds and obeys the demon who holds the fibers of his

very life" (Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,* 156). There is a more accurate translation in Weber, *The Vocation Lectures*: "We must go about our work and meet 'the challenges of the day'—both in our human relations and our vocation. But that moral is simple and straightforward if each person finds and obeys the daemon that holds the threads of *his* life" (31; emphasis in original).

16. Martha Nussbaum provides a rich gloss for the Greek concept of eudaimonia (her preferred spelling). Eudaimonia is "human flourishing, a complete human life," and refers to everything a person imbues with intrinsic value (*Upheavals of Thought,* 32).

17. Doris Chang usefully surveys the politics of the process by which the supplement came into being in "An Introduction to the Politics of Science."

18. See Orr, "The Ecstasy of Miscommunication," 161. See also Orr's innovative history and ethnography of "the psychic life of panic" (*Panic Diaries*).

19. Safire, "Beware 'Animal Spirits.'"

20. Brooks, "A Nation of Grinders," 16.

21. Ibid.

22. The subject would take me too far afield, but this description of mania overlaps in some ways with the "pathological narcissist," a personality type that has been described as a radical conformist who paradoxically sees himself as an outlaw. Žižek, *Looking Awry,* 102–3.

23. Serres, "The Geometry of the Incommunicable," 52.

24. Foucault, "Madness, the Absence of Work." In Michel Serres's words, subjects would arise "who can finally speak of their own country, conceive of their own domain" ("The Geometry of the Incommunicable," 51–52). For Foucault, this would alter the "precarious . . . relationship of our culture to this truth about itself, far away and inverted, which it discovers over and over in madness" ("Madness, the Absence of Work," 98).

25. Foucault, "Madness, the Absence of Work," 99.

26. Ibid. Emphasis in original.

27. I am indebted to Jackie Orr for this point.

28. Another way to approach this issue is to work toward a more effective definition of mental illness. Jerome Wakefield develops this approach as a way of clarifying the sometimes muddled definitions of "disorder" and "disability" in the DSM. These definitions are, I would agree, badly in need of clarification, in particular, as Wakefield persuasively argues,

to clarify what "dysfunction" means. The problems that concern me in this book are quite different, however, and would persist no matter how mental illnesses were redefined. As long as "dysfunction" in the definition of mental illness was still connected to irrationality, the social processes I describe—in which the rational and irrational are inextricably intertwined—retain their relevance. For specific analysis of problems with the definition of social phobia, see Wakefield, "Disorder as Harmful Dysfunction." Wakefield, Horwitz, and Schmitz, "Are We Overpathologizing the Socially Anxious?"

29. Chaffin, *Manic Depression*.